Server-client PKI for applied key management system and process

ABSTRACT

Embodiments described herein relate to obtaining a public key for an application of a communication device, including, but not limited to, receiving a request from the communication device to obtain the public key, evaluating the request based on at least one policy, requesting the public key from a public key infrastructure (PKI) in response to determining that the request is authorized, receiving the public key from the PKI, and sending the public key to the communication device.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED PATENT APPLICATIONS

This application is a Divisional application of U.S. application Ser. No. 15/067,035, filed Mar. 10, 2016, which claims priority from Provisional Application U.S. Application 62/132,342, filed Mar. 12, 2015, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. This application is related to U.S. application Ser. No. 14/506,346, titled System And Method For Encryption Key Management Federation And Distribution, and filed Oct. 3, 2014, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. The present disclosure claims priority to, and the benefit of, U.S. provisional patent application Ser. No. 62/300,352, titled Policy-Enabled Encryption Keys Having Complex Logical Operations, and filed on Feb. 26, 2016, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. The present disclosure claims priority to, and the benefit of, U.S. provisional patent application Ser. No. 62/300,521, titled Policy-Enabled Encryption Keys Having Ephemeral Policies, and filed on Feb. 26, 2016, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. The present disclosure claims priority to, and the benefit of, U.S. provisional patent application Ser. No. 62/300,670, titled Structure Of Policies For Evaluating Key Attributes Of Encryption Keys, and filed on Feb. 26, 2016, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. The present disclosure claims priority to, and the benefit of, U.S. provisional patent application Ser. No. 62/300,687, titled Linking Encryption Key Management With Granular Policy, and filed on Feb. 26, 2016, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. The present disclosure claims priority to, and the benefit of, U.S. provisional patent application Ser. No. 62/300,699 titled System And Method For Associating Encryption Key Management Policy With Device Activity, and filed on Feb. 26, 2016, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. The present disclosure claims priority to, and the benefit of, U.S. provisional patent application Ser. No. 62/300,717, titled System And Method For Hierarchy Manipulation In An Encryption Key Management System, and filed on Feb. 26, 2016, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

1. Field

Embodiments of the present disclosure relate generally to security objects used in communication systems and, more specifically, to generation, management, distribution, federation, and/or applied key management of security objects.

2. Background

In security systems, an encryption key refers to a parameter or data that dictates how plain data may be translated into encrypted data during an encryption process and encrypted data into plain data during a decryption process. Typically, the encryption key is made available both of a source device (e.g., a transmitting device) and a target device (e.g., a receiving device) in a communication transaction. Given that encryption keys are used pervasively, effective management of the encryption keys (as well as other security objects) to defend and respond to threats against the security systems is of paramount importance.

Traditionally, encryption key management is initiated and executed at the device level (e.g., by the source device and/or the target device that are involved in the communication transaction). Communication management, on the other hand, is traditionally centrally managed at a higher level (e.g., by a server for the source device and target device). The end result may be that the encryption management is procedurally unsynchronized with communications management. Thus, loose controls of encryption keys, as demonstrated in current public key infrastructure (PKI) instances, may result. In addition, loose controls of symmetric keys generated and distributed in an enterprise may also occur. Accordingly, an end result may be a breakdown in communication management or communication security. Similar problems confront other types of encryption objects.

Secure Shell (SSH) and other interface/protocol for system access conventionally focus on localized generation of encryption keys for user authentication. Some applications such as, but not limited to, messaging, communication application, and the like may require separate distribution of symmetric and/or asymmetric keys for encrypted communication. Storage and distribution of encrypted information conventionally require separate key management and distribution activities. For example, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)-based email services at a client may require separate distribution of public keys to enable message encryption using recipient's public keys.

SUMMARY OF THE DISCLOSURE

The current disclosure describes embodiments relating to security object applied key management, including, but not limited to, management, distribution, and federation of security objects. Security objects may include, but not limited to, encryption keys and other security objects (such as, but not limited to, user identity information, certificates, biometric data, random number generator data, determinate random number generator data, non-determinate random number generator data, user authentication information, policy components, other components associated with organization security component, and/or the like).

Embodiments described herein relate to providing a client-based service in connection with applied key management at an applied key management server or system for enabling defined key management. An interface may be provided to a client to enable such client-based service for local applications, servers, and infrastructures. A job or transaction associated with the client may be inspected by policies at the applied key management server or system. In some embodiments, an interface may be provided to the client to support automated distribution of public keys associated with a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for email encryption at the client. Accordingly, the interface provided at the client may allow integration with the applied key management operations at the applied key management server or system to enable secure communications, including secure PKI email services.

In some embodiments, a method for obtaining a public key for an application of a communication device includes receiving a request from the communication device to obtain the public key, evaluating the request based on at least one policy, requesting the public key from a public key infrastructure (PKI) in response to determining that the request is authorized, receiving the public key from the PKI, and sending the public key to the communication device.

In some embodiments, the application is an email application. The request corresponds to a recipient of an email. The request includes an email address corresponding to the recipient. The public key is associated with the recipient.

In some embodiments, the request from the communication device is received via a first network link. The public key is request from the PKI via a second network link.

In some embodiments, evaluating the request based on the at least one policy includes determining whether requesting the public key for the email address corresponding to the recipient is authorized.

In various embodiments, evaluating the request based on the at least one policy includes determining whether the communication device is authorized to request the public key based on the at least one policy.

In some embodiments, the method further includes connecting to the PKI.

In some embodiments, the method further includes sending a failure message to the communication device in response to determining that the request is unauthorized.

In some embodiments, the method further includes determining whether the public key is received and sending the public key in response to determining that the public key has been received.

In some embodiments, the method further includes sending a failure message to the communication device in response to determining that the public key has not been received.

In some embodiments, an applied key management system, including a memory and a processor, the processor is configured to receive a request from the communication device to obtain the public key, evaluate the request based on at least one policy, request the public key from a PKI in response to determine that the request is authorized, receive the public key from the PKI, and send the public key to the communication device.

In some embodiments, a non-transitory processor-readable medium having processor-readable instructions, such that, when executed, causes a processor to receive a request from the communication device to obtain the public key, evaluate the request based on at least one policy, request the public key from a PKI in response to determine that the request is authorized, receive the public key from the PKI, and send the public key to the communication device.

In some embodiments, a method for obtaining a public key for an application of a communication device includes requesting the public key from an applied key management system, receiving the public key from the applied key management system, wherein the public key is authorized by at least one policy, and using the public key for the application.

In some embodiments, the method further includes determining whether the public key is available in a local key store of the communication device and requesting the public key in response to determining that the public key is unavailable.

In some embodiments, the method further includes determining whether the public key is received from the applied key management system and using the public key for the application in response to determining that the public key is received from the applied key management system.

In some embodiments, the method further includes notifying an operator of the communication device in response to determining that the public key is not received from the applied key management system.

In some embodiments, the public key is unavailable in response to determining one or more of the public key is not present in the local key store, the public key in the local key store needs to be renewed, or the public key in the local key store is revoked.

In various embodiments, the application is an email application.

In some embodiments, using the public key for the application includes adding the public key to the local key store and using the public key to encrypt a message of the application.

In some embodiments, a communication device includes a local key store, a memory, and a processor implementing a client plugin and a client interface. The client plugin is configured to interface with an application, determine whether a public key corresponding to a recipient of a message associated with the application is available in the local key store, and the client interface is configured to request the public key from an applied key management system in response to determining that the public key is unavailable and receive the public key from the applied key management system.

In some embodiments, anon-transitory processor-readable medium having processor-readable instructions, such that, when executed, causes a processor to request the public key from an applied key management system, receive the public key from the applied key management system, wherein the public key is authorized by at least one policy, and use the public key for the application.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of a general applied key management system according to various embodiments.

FIG. 2 is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of an applied key management system according to various embodiments.

FIG. 3 is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key federation system as implemented in various embodiments.

FIG. 4 is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of a communication device consuming applied key management services according to some embodiments.

FIG. 5 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of a request authentication process for issuing requests and receiving encryption keys according to some embodiments.

FIG. 6 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of a communication device registration process implemented in various applied key management systems according to various embodiments.

FIG. 7 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of a key management and distribution process according to various embodiments.

FIG. 8 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of a key federation process according to various embodiments.

FIG. 9 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key management and distribution process according to various embodiments.

FIG. 10 is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of relationship between a communication device, applied key management system, and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) according to various embodiments.

FIG. 11 is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of a communication device according to some embodiments.

FIG. 12 is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of an applied key management system according to some embodiments.

FIG. 13 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key request method according to various embodiments.

FIG. 14 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key request method according to various embodiments.

FIG. 15 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key request method according to various embodiments.

FIG. 16 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key request method according to various embodiments.

FIG. 17 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key request method according to various embodiments.

FIG. 18 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key request method according to various embodiments.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

In the following description of various embodiments, reference is made to the accompanying drawings which form a part hereof and in which are shown by way of illustration specific embodiments in which the embodiments may be practiced. It is to be understood that other embodiments may be utilized, and structural changes may be made without departing from the scope of the various embodiments disclosed in the present disclosure.

Embodiments described herein generally relate to security object applied key management. The security object applied key management may include management, distribution, and federation of the security object. Security objects may include encryption keys and other sensitive objects (such as, but not limited to, user identity information, certificates, biometric data, random number generator data, determinate random number generator data, non-determinate random number generator data, user authentication information, policy components, other components associated with organization security component, and/or the like). In the present disclosure, encryption key-based applied key management is described in various embodiments as examples of the security object applied key management systems and methods. It should be appreciated that the applied key management systems and methods are likewise applicable to other security objects, including those described above.

As used herein, “applied key management” may refer to a combination of key management, key federation, and key distribution activities in one or more enterprises. For example, embodiments described may be associated with the applied key management of encryption key information correlated with utilizing encryption in the one or more enterprises. “Enterprise key management” may include managing and/or overseeing the multiple uses of asymmetric and symmetric keys required for encrypting data, signing emails, authenticating web services, and/or other potential uses. This may also include encryption management for communications systems to include radio, cellular, satellite and internet protocol based communications. “Enterprise key federation” may include coordinating and negotiating the federation of key information to a plurality of disparate applied key management platforms (each associated with disparate federating organizations) based on established trust between the federating organizations (e.g., the enterprises). “Key distribution” may refer to a centralized distribution (e.g., pushing or forwarding) of key material to support encryption operations within a local enterprise and/or a foreign enterprise. In particular, key distribution may be concerned with assigning or otherwise transmitting the appropriate encryption keys to an appropriately associated device (e.g., the communication device, which may either be a source device or a target device).

Embodiments of applied key management (e.g., an applied key management device such as a management request handler coupled to a request handler and various supporting databases) may provide control of encryption key management, federation, and distribution through a centralized user interface. Such applied key management devices may provide centralized systems and/or methods of managing encryption keys associated with communications, infrastructure, and applications. Such applied key management devices may also manage device enrollment, monitor device health related to encryption capabilities, and monitor status for applied key management activities. Such capabilities may allow robust transaction reporting to support audit activities associated with communications, application, and infrastructure management.

Applied key management may be leveraged for additional systems other than the communication systems. Other implementations of applied key management may include application encryption management, virtualization encryption management, storage encryption management, and/or user identity encryption management. In short, if applications, communications, or infrastructures require use of encryption (or other types of security mechanisms using security objects) and keys (or security objects), applied key management may be applied to provide advantages as described. Communication systems may include, but are not limited to, radio communications, cellular communications, transmission control protocol/internet protocol (TCP/IP) based communications, satellite communications equipment, and the like. Application systems may include, but are not limited to voice-over-internet protocol VOIP applications, virtualization, identification and authentication, messaging, local storage. Infrastructure systems may include, but are not limited to storage solutions, physical security infrastructure, and medical equipment.

In particular embodiments, an applied key management device may enable encryption key lifecycle activities across multiple types of communication devices in a centralized manner. The applied key management device may leverage industry standards for key management for interoperability with existing systems and may use, for example, protocols for applied key management as a part of applied key management. A distinction between applied key management and key management alone may be demonstrated in encryption key management and key distribution for communication systems. Given the requirement to make new encryption connections before breaking existing connections, typical communication systems cannot utilize rekey commands as it would break communications before management steps are taken to establish new lines of communications. However, rekey commands may work for infrastructure—to include storage, applications and virtualization solutions—where services can be reestablished without loss of centralized control of the managed capability.

The system architecture of applied key management can be configured to allow for use of a standard-based approach for supported systems such as key management interoperability protocol (KMIP), for example, but also the capability to develop support interfaces for non-standardized systems such as physical security infrastructure, virtualization applications, satellite communications systems, and medical equipment. This may be accomplished by architecturally separating message handling from support interfaces. Using a purely KMIP example, a storage device may receive a “rekey” command, a communication equipment may receive “put-and-notify” commands, and cellular devices may request queued “notify” commands informing the cellular devices to send “get messages” to the applied key management device to be relayed to key management and generation system components. Example systems implementing such features are discussed below.

Embodiments described herein may include an applied key management device to implement centralized, top-down enterprise encryption key management encryption keys (e.g., such as, but not limited to symmetric key encryption, asymmetric key encryption, and the like) as well as other security objects used in security systems. Such centralized, top-down control of encryption may be for a given enterprise. Embodiments may include implementing coordinated KMIP on enterprise key management, communications systems, applications, and infrastructure for encryption key lifecycle functions implementing at least one of: device registration, user registration, system and user initialization, key material installation, key establishment, key registration, operational use, key storage, key distribution, key update, key recovery, key de-registration, key destruction, key revocation, and the like.

As referred to herein, a “key attribute” (attribute, encryption attribute, and/or the like) associated with an encryption key may refer to a characteristic associated with the encryption key, cryptographic or security characteristics of the encryption key, the cryptographic algorithms of the encryption key, a device generating/transmitting/receiving the encryption key, a user of the device, and/or the like. Each encryption key may be associated with at least one key attribute. The encryption key may be transmitted and/or received with its associated key attributes represented in data values.

As referred to herein, a “policy” may be a rule managing an encryption key based on key attribute(s) associated with that encryption key. In particular embodiments, a policy may dictate whether the particular encryption key is an acceptable encryption key. Such acceptability may be based on the security and cryptographic considerations as to whether the encryption key (e.g., as shown from the key attributes associated with the encryption key) may be secure enough. In other words, the encryption key generated for a particular communication transaction may be presented for inspection by the policy to be evaluated as to whether the encryption key is to be allowed or denied for that communication transaction.

Some embodiments include an interface for applied key management for mobile communication devices (e.g., a wireless device, and/or the like), or provide an interface for applied key management for radio/satellite communications systems to include telemetry and payload in satellite communications. Particular implementations of the embodiments may include interfaces for banking applications such as, but not limited to, automated teller machines (ATMs), bank account interfaces, and the like. The interfaces for banking applications may be implemented on any mobile or non-mobile devices. Embodiments may provide an interface for applied key management for applications that include virtualization or providing an interface for applied key management for network infrastructure to include routers, switches, virtual private network (VPN) appliances, firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDSs), intrusion prevention system (IPSs), tokenizers, and/or the like.

For example, a centralized encryption management may be provided for symmetric encryption keys or asymmetric encryption keys, in both private and/or public contexts. In some embodiments, existing network infrastructure information may be consumed to distribute encryption keys based on active/inactive status of network infrastructure or distributing and managing encryption keys for network infrastructure based on equipment that can readily accept encryption keys (e.g., existing hardware/software may be installed on the equipment for accepting encryption keys).

Embodiments may queue encryption key transaction information for communication devices not available at the point of a given encryption management operation (e.g., in a push-key event). In addition, embodiments described herein may centrally display encryption key lifecycle information (for supported infrastructure) and successful encryption key management transactions. In addition to or as an alternative, failure message and/or a cause of unsuccessful encryption key management transactions may be displayed.

In some embodiments, a service interface for a communication device to acquire new asymmetric keys on a timed basis may be provided. In addition, a service interface for a communication device to acquire new symmetric keys on a timed basis may be provided. In some embodiments, a service interface for a communication device to acquire new asymmetric keys on user initiated basis may be provided. In various embodiments, a service interface for a communication device to acquire new symmetric keys on a user initiated basis may be provided. Also, federated distribution of encryption keys based on established trust based key exchange between two or more key management and applied key management devices may be provided as described.

In some embodiments, distributing federated symmetric key to local enterprise infrastructure based on configurations for federated symmetric key distribution may be provided. In various embodiments, distributing federated asymmetric key to local enterprise infrastructure based on configurations for federated asymmetric key distribution may be provided. In addition, implementing federated trust model by using multiple devices and split key distribution may be provided to establish trust between two untrusted entities that need to communicate securely.

The applied key management device (e.g., the management request handler and associated components) may include sub-modules including a business logic module, authentication and authorization module, policy enforcement module, system consistency/validation module, and/or the like for performing functions described herein.

FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an example of a general applied key management system 100 as implemented in various embodiments. In various embodiments, an applied key management device 110 may be coupled to at least one source device 150 a and at least one target device 150 b. The applied key management device 110 may include at least one desktop computer, mainframe computer, laptop computer, pad device, smart phone device or the like, configured with hardware and software to perform operations described herein. For example, the applied key management device 110 may include computation systems having suitable processing capabilities, memory, user interface (e.g., display and input) capabilities, and communication capabilities configured with suitable software to perform operations described herein. Thus, particular embodiments may be implemented, using processor devices that are often already present in many business and organization environments, by configuring such devices with suitable software processes described herein. Accordingly, such embodiments may be implemented with minimal additional hardware costs. However, other embodiments of the applied key management device 110 may relate to systems and processes that are implemented with dedicated device hardware/devices specifically configured for performing operations described herein.

Generally, the source device 150 a may be a communication device transmitting data (or initiating communication) for which encryption (and therefore an encryption key) may be required or preferred. The target device 150 b may be a communication device for receiving data that may have been encrypted (e.g., with an encryption key). According to various embodiments, the source device 150 a and/or the target device 150 b may be an ATM. The source device 150 a and/or the target device 150 b may also be any server or device for storing bank account information and executing banking functions. In particular embodiments, each of the source device 150 a and the target device 150 b may include a mobile smart phone (such as, but not limited to an iPhone™, an Android™ phone, or the like) or other wireless mobile communication devices with suitable processing and encryption capabilities. Typical modern mobile communication devices include telephone communication electronics as well as some processor electronics, one or more display devices and a keypad and/or other user input device. In further embodiments, each of the source device 150 a and the target device 150 b may include any suitable type of mobile phone and/or other type of portable electronic communication device, such as, but not limited to, an electronic smart pad device (such as, but not limited to an iPad™), a portable computer, or the like. It should be noted that an encryption key may originate from the source device 150 a or the target device 150 b, and/or both. In other words, either of the source device 150 a or the target device 150 b may be a key source 170. The source device 150 a and the target device 150 b may be associated with a same enterprise or separate enterprises. In other embodiments, one or both of the source device 150 a and the target device 150 b may be a wired device suitable for communication with a wired or wireless device.

In some embodiments, the applied key management device 110 may be a part of the enterprise associated with the source device 150 a and target device 150 b. An enterprise may be an organization or security unit having dominance over at least one source device 150 a and/or target device 150 b. With respect to communication between the source device 150 a and the target device 150 b associated with disparate enterprises, the source device 150 a may be associated with a first enterprise and the target device 150 b may be associated with a second disparate enterprise. An enterprise may be a company, subgroup within a company, autonomous and independent entity, a communication group, security provider, various entities, organizations, and/or the like. Each applied key management device 110 may perform applied key management activities for a plurality of devices such as the source device 150 a and the target devices 150 b, establishing a hierarchical model for applied key management.

In other embodiments, the applied key management device 110 may be a third party server coupled to the enterprise associated with the source device 150 a and/or target device 150 b. Thus, various embodiments may affect centralization of applied key management with existing communication systems and protocols of the enterprise. In other words, the applied key management device 110 may be implemented to cooperate with the existing encryption technology for communications, applications, and infrastructure. Applied key management (e.g., by a third party or otherwise) may interact with both the sources and targets of key information (e.g., the encryption key and the associated key attributes 160). Accordingly, a top-down control of applied key management may be achieved, while maintaining a request model in which the source device 150 a and the target device 150 b may request key information.

In some embodiments, a key source 170 may be coupled to the applied key management device 110. The key source 170 may be any source by which an encryption key (or any other types of security objects) may be generated. In some embodiments, the key source 170 may be a part of the applied key management device 110 (e.g., a module or database within the applied key management device 110 or coupled to the applied key management device 110). In other embodiments, the key source 170 may be a source external to the applied key management device 110. The key source 170 may include the source device 150 a and/or the target device 150 b, one or more of which may be capable of generating encryption keys for the communication therebetween. Alternatively or additionally, the key source 170 may be a key-generating device (other than the source device 150 a and the target device 150 b) internal or external to the same enterprise as the source device 150 a and/or the target device 150 b. In these cases, the key source 170 may be an existing specialized key generating device implemented separately from the applied key management device 110 (e.g., the key generation and management device 230 of FIG. 2). Other examples of the key source 170 may include a management user interface 220 of FIG. 2 (e.g., encryption keys may be generated manually through the management user interface 220), a key federation interface 260 of FIG. 2 (e.g., encryption keys generated from a disparate enterprise), various databases storing generated encryption keys, and/or the like.

In various embodiments, a request 175 may be sent to the applied key management device 110. The request 175 may be a request to generate an encryption key. For example, the applied key management device 110 may itself generate (or retrieve from a database coupled to the applied key management device 110) encryption keys in response to the request 175. In other examples, the applied key management device 110 may request an encryption key from other devices (e.g., the key source 170) within the same or a disparate enterprise.

The request 175 may originate from the source device 150 a, the target device 150 b, the applied key management device itself 110, a third-party device within the same enterprise (e.g., the management user interface 220, the key management interface 240, and the like), a third-party device in a disparate enterprise (e.g., from the key federation interface 260 of FIG. 2), and/or the like. Embodiments of the applied key management device 110 may therefore serve as an intermediary device between the source device 150 a, the target device 150 b, the requesting device (which issues the request 175), the key source 170, and/or the like. Accordingly, key management, distribution, and federation may effectively be managed for various devices in a same or disparate enterprise.

Various components within the general applied key management system 100 (e.g., the applied key management device 110, the source device 150 a, the target device 150 b, the applied key management device itself 110, the device that issues the request 175, the key source 170, and/or the like) may be connected via any suitable wired or wireless network. The network may be secured or unsecured. For example, the network may be a wide area communication network, such as, but not limited to, the internet, or one or more intranets, local area networks (LANs), ethernet networks, metropolitan area networks (MANs), a wide area network (WAN), combinations thereof, or the like. In particular embodiments, the network may represent one or more secure networks configured with suitable security features, such as, but not limited to firewalls, encryption, or other software or hardware configurations that inhibits access to network communications by unauthorized personnel or entities.

In some embodiments, key attributes 160 may refer generally to characteristics associated with the encryption key itself, characteristics of a device associated with the encryption key, and/or the like. In other words, the key attributes 160 may refer to when, where, how, for what, with what device the encryption key has been or is about to be generated. Examples of the key attributes 160 may include, but not limited to, encryption key size, a classification of the encryption key, a time at which the encryption key has been or about to be generated (e.g., by the key source 170), a location in which the encryption key has been or about to be generated (e.g., by the key source 170), a role associated with the key source 170, a role associated with the source device 150 a, a role associated with the target device 150 b, a role associated with a key generating/storage device, a role associated with a user of the source device 150 a, the target device 150 b, the key generating/storage device, the source 170, a combination thereof, and/or the like.

In some embodiments, the key attributes 160 may include the key size. Typically, the larger the key size (i.e., the longer the encryption key), the more security it may provide for the communication. The key attributes 160 may also include the classification of the encryption key. In various embodiments, the classification of the encryption key may refer to its utilization e.g., what the encryption key may be used for. Examples of the utilization may include (e.g., for communication systems) whether an encryption key is a global hopping key, whether the encryption key is a secret key, whether the encryption key is symmetrical or asymmetrical, a combination thereof, and/or the like.

In some embodiments, the key attributes 160 may include a time and/or location at which the encryption key has been or about to be generated. As described, the time and/or location at which the encryption key may be generated may be defined from the perspective of the source device 150 a, the target device 150 b, and/or any other key sources 170. For example, when an encryption key is generated (and/or sent, received), a corresponding time of the device (e.g., the key sources 170) generating (and/or sending, receiving) the encryption key may be determined. The encryption key may be transmitted/stored with a time stamp representing the time. Similarly, when an encryption key is generated (and/or sent, received), a corresponding geo-location of the device (e.g., the key sources 170) generating (and/or sending, receiving) the encryption key may be determined. The encryption key may be transmitted/stored with the geo-location.

In various embodiments, the key attributes 160 may include role(s) associated the source device 150 a, the target device 150 b, the key source 170, the other key generating/storage device, as well as their associated user. Particularly, a role may refer to a group/classification (e.g., based on predefined assignment, time, geo-location of the device, whether the device is generating encryption keys, whether the device is transmitting the encryption key, whether the device is receiving the encryption keys, and/or the like) in which the device/user is assigned to, a level of security clearance, the type of the device/user, a combination thereof, and/or the like. In particular examples, each device/user may be associated with at least a security group (e.g., assigned to a server). Within each security group, subgroups may exist to further subdivide the devices/users. The groups/subgroups may be predetermined by any suitable personnel. In other or further embodiments, the groups/subgroups may be defined when the encryption key is generated (e.g., based on current characteristics of the device such as geo-location, time of the day, and/or the like).

It should be appreciated by one of ordinary skill in the art that one or more key attributes 160 may be associated with a given encryption key. In fact, as implemented in various embodiments, an encryption key may be associated with a plurality of key attributes 160. The encryption key may be transmitted along with the associated key attributes 160 to a device (e.g., the applied key management device 110). The encryption key and the key attributes 160 associated with the encryption key may be inspected according to at least one policy related to the key attributes 160. Such process may be referred to as “shooting” the key attributes 160 against the relevant policies or “presenting” the key attributes 160 for “inspection” by the policy.

The encryption keys may generally be managed by a set of policies 115. As implemented in various embodiments, a policy may refer to at least one defined rules governing the criteria for the key attributes 160. In some embodiments, a policy engine (e.g., as embedded in the applied key management device 110 and/or other devices as described herein) may receive the encryption key and the key attributes 160 associated with the encryption key as input. The policy engine may output a response as to whether the encryption key may be allowable based on the key attributes 160. In particular embodiments, the policy engine may output a binary response (e.g., accepted or denied).

The encryption key and the associated key attributes 160 may be presented for inspection one or more times per communication transaction. In some embodiments, the encryption key and the associated key attributes 160 may only be required to be presented for inspection by policy 115 once per communication transaction (e.g., at the initiation stage before the communication transaction has taken place but after the encryption key has been generated). In other or further embodiments, the encryption key and the associated key attributes 160 may be required to be presented for inspection by the policies 115 periodically and/or every time the encryption key has been altered for a given communication transaction. In some case several encryption keys may be presented for inspection by the policies 115 for a given communication transaction.

The policy engine may identify the key attributes 160 received. The policy engine may retrieve relevant policy 115 from a local or remote storage database. In other embodiments, the policy engine may inspect particular key attributes 160 (or sometimes all key attributes 160) associated with the encryption key as the policy engine determines acceptability based on the predefined set of policies 115. For example, the policy engine may determine, based on the relevant policy 115, whether the encryption key should be accepted for the communication transaction for which the encryption key may be generated.

In one non-limiting example, the policies 115 may dictate that a size of the encryption key must be within a predetermined range (e.g., the size of the encryption key must exceed and/or be below 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits, and/or the like). In some cases, the policy 115 may dictate that the size of the encryption keys must be a particular key size (e.g., 256-bit, and/or the like).

The policies 115 may require that the geo-location attribute of the key attributes 160 to be associated with (or not associated with) a predetermined location and/or within (or not within) a predetermined area. For example, when the geo-location attribute of the encryption key (e.g., as defined by the geo-location of the generating, transmitting, and/or receiving device of the encryption key) is associated with a “danger” zone, the policy engine may deny the encryption key. This is because there may be a high likelihood that the encryption key may be compromised in the danger zone. On the other hand, when the geo-location attribute of the encryption key is associated with a “safe” zone, then the encryption key may be allowed for the communication transaction. This is because there may be at most a low likelihood of included security keys. In further embodiments, a “neutral” zone may be a safe zone, or, in the alternative, a zone associated with an intermediate likelihood of included security keys.

In another non-limiting example, the policies 115 may require the time attribute of the key attributes 160 to be within (or not within) a predetermined time period. The policy 115 may deny the encryption key on the basis that the time attribute (e.g., a time stamp) associated with the creation, transmission, and/or reception of the encryption key may be outside of a predetermined time period (for example, at 3:00 am, where acceptable creation, transmission, and/or reception time of the encryption key may be between 9:00 am-5:00 pm).

In various embodiments, the policies 115 may allow the encryption key, when the role attribute of the key attributes 160 is associated with the encryption key generating/transmitting/receiving device (and the device's associated user) is within a predetermined accepted group. In some examples, the source device 150 a (the target device 150 b or other source devices 170) associated with a first security group within an enterprise may generate an encryption key and present the encryption key for inspection by the policy 115. The policy engine may determine whether the first security group may be a part of the accepted group. When the policy engine determined that the source device 150 a (the target device 150 b or other source devices 170) is a part of the accepted group (e.g., the first security group falls within the accepted group), the encryption key may be allowed for the communication transaction for which the encryption has been created for.

It should be appreciated by one of ordinary skill in the art that a plurality of policies 115 may act in concert for a comprehensive encryption key management scheme. This means that, the plurality of policies 115, each of which may regulate at least one disparate key attribute 160, may be aggregated into a set of policies 115 for regulating encryption keys presented to the policy engine.

In other examples, other key sources 170 (e.g., other than the source device 150 a and the target device 150 b) may generate an encryption key to be distributed (or pushed) to the source device 150 a and/or the target device 150 b for a communication transaction between those devices. The policy engine (e.g., the applied key management device 110) may inspect the key attributes 160 to determine whether the encryption key is allowable. In response to the encryption key being determined to be allowable, the applied key management device 110 may determine to distribute the encryption key to the source device 150 a and/or the target device 150 b for the communication transaction.

In various embodiments, when the policy engine denies the encryption key, the policy engine may transmit a rejection indicator (e.g., a “denied” message) to the key source 170. The key generating device may redesign a second encryption key to be presented (along with the key attributes 160 associated with the second encryption key) to the policy engine for a second round of inspection. In other embodiments, when the policy engine denies the encryption key, the policy engine may transmit a “denied” message to the key source 170 along with a cause of failure (e.g., a hint) as to which the key attribute 160 caused the denial and/or what it should be.

For example, an encryption key with key attributes 160 including a time attribute of 4:49 am, geo-location attribute of “safe zone,” and role attribute of “security group A” may be presented to a set of policies 115. The policy engine may allow the encryption key when the encryption key is generated between 5:00 a.m.-9:00 p.m., in either a “safe zone” or a “neutral zone,” and for security groups A-C. Such encryption key may be denied, given that it is not generated between 5:00 a.m.-9:00 p.m. The policy engine may transmit the “denied” message along with a time attribute hint (e.g., to generate the encryption key after 5:00 a.m., in 11 minutes).

Accordingly, the applied key management device 110 may be configured to manage encryption keys and distribute the encryption keys. In other words, the applied key management device 110 may serve as an intermediary between the source devices 150 a, the target devices 150 b, other key sources 170, and/or the like as these devices themselves may lack the capability to distribute and manage encryptions in the manner set forth with respect to the applied key management device 110. The applied key management device 110 may include a plurality of modules (or may be coupled to remote modules) for each feature as described herein. In addition, the general applied key management system 100 may be coupled with at least one other similar general applied key management system 100 to make up the encryption key federation scheme as described herein.

FIG. 2 is schematic diagram illustrating an example of an applied key management system 200 according to various embodiments. In some embodiments, the applied key management system 200 may illustrate a particularized implementation of the general applied key management system 100. From an architectural perspective, embodiments as illustrated for the applied key management system 200 may be centered around message handling and interoperability with key generation technology, other applied key management devices, supported communications systems, applications, and infrastructure.

The applied key management device 110 may include at least a management request handler 205, a request handler 210, a support structure 215, a key federation interface 260, as well as the associated databases (e.g., a local key database 270, transactions database 275, policy database 280, local user repository 285, configuration database 290, device inventory database 295).

In various embodiments, the management request handler 205 may include (or is) the policy engine that may be implemented for policy-based encryption key management, distribution, and federation. As the management request handler 205 can be an intermediary layer between the various components described, rapid integration of the policy-based encryption key management, distribution, and federation may be added to an existing system without having to make changes to the system level message handling. The management request handler 205 may provide a top-down management for various communication devices (e.g., a cellular device 250 a, a network device 250 b, . . . , a device N 250 n, and/or the like) associated with a given enterprise. In various embodiments, each of the cellular device 250 a, the network device 250 b, . . . , and the device N 250 n may be the source device 150 a or the target device 150 b depending on the particular communication transaction for which the encryption key is generated.

The management request handler 205 and the request handler 210 may be of an agent-interface relationship. That is, the request handler 210 may serve as the interface between the management request handler 205 and the various communication devices associated with the enterprise (e.g., the cellular device 250 a, the network device 250 b, . . . , the device N 250 n, and/or the like). The communication between the management request handler 205 and the request handler 210 may be facilitated by the support structure 215. The support structure 215 may provide suitable communication protocol, management application, infrastructure, communication application program interface (API), configurations, translations, and/or the like for interfacing between the management request handler 205 and the request handler 210.

The request handler 210 may receive key generating requests 175 and/or encryption keys from the various communication devices and relate them to the management request handler 205 with the assistance from the support structure 215. The request handler 210 may also relate the response of the management request handler 205 (including the hint in some embodiments) and/or encryption keys to the various communication devices with the assistance from the support structure 215.

In various embodiments, the management request handler 205 may receive the request 175 for generating an encryption key. Various components may be capable of transmitting the request 175 to the management request handler 205. The some embodiments, the management request handler 205 may receive the request 175 from the various communication devices associated with the enterprise (e.g., the cellular device 250 a, network device 250 b, . . . , device N 250 n, and/or the like). The request 175 may be related by the request handler 210, which may serve as the interface between the devices and the management request handler as described. The key federation interface 260, the management user interface 220, and the key management interface 240 may also transmit the request 175 to the management request handler.

In non-request-driven embodiments, the management request handler 205 may receive encryption keys from at least one key source 170. The key source 170 may be the key generation and management device 230, which may be any suitable existing encryption key generating apparatus implemented within the enterprise. In other words, the key generation and management device 230 may represent any existing schemes internal or external to the communication systems of the enterprise. For example, the key generation and management device 230 may be any suitable native protocol associated with safe net equipment.

Embodiments of the key management interface 240 may represent an internal integration of key generation and key management capabilities as well as an external interface with existing solutions. This is because the key management interface 240 may be poised between the key generation and management device 230 (which may generate encryption keys) and the management request handler 205 (which inspects key attributes 160 of the encryption keys based on policies 115). For example, the key management interface 240 may be a translation interface that maintains a standard encryption management messaging language with the applied key management device 110. This can allow enterprise interoperability between existing solutions (e.g., the key generation and management device 230) and the applied key management platform (e.g., the management request handler 205). Accordingly, the policy-based applied key management systems and methods may be implemented with various types of security object (e.g., encryption key) generation protocols.

Additionally or alternatively, in request-driven embodiments, the management user interface 220 may transmit the request 175 to the management request handler 210. The management user interface 220 may utilize the same API as other components described herein to assure interoperability. The management user interface 220 may include suitable user input and display devices to receive and display data to a designated managing user. In particular embodiments, the management user interface 220 may include a mobile device such as a smartphone or a tablet. The management user interface 220 may also include a wired device.

In some embodiments, the key federation interface 260 may transmit the request 175 to the management request handler 205. The key federation interface 260 may be in communication with a second key federation interface (such as, but not limited to, the key federation interface 260) associated with a disparate enterprise (which may utilize the same or similar applied key management systems and methods described). When one of the various communication devices (e.g., the cellular device 250 a, network device 250 b, . . . , device N 250 n, and/or the like) wishes communicate with another device from the disparate enterprise (or vice versa), the request 175 may be transmitted (from the key federation interface 260 of the second enterprise) to the key federation interface 260 of the current enterprise. In some embodiments, the request 175 may be directly transmitted to the management request handler 205 when the key federation interface 260 has designated the relationship between the enterprises to be trusted.

In some embodiments, instead of or in addition to the request 175, encryption keys as well as the “allowed” and “denied” messages may be transmitted and received between the key federation interface 260 (of the current and the second enterprise). The encryption key and its associated attributes 160 may be stored in the local key database 270, which may be accessible by the management request handler 205 (for policy inspection) and/or the request handler 210 (for distribution).

The request 175 may be transmitted with further instructions related to generating the encryption key. The further instructions include, but are not limited to, a source of encryption keys, the encryption keys themselves, key attributes 160 associated with the encryption keys, and/or the like.

In various embodiments, in response to receiving the request 175, the management request handler 205 may generate or facilitate the generation of the encryption key. For example, where the request 175 may be silent as to where the encryption key is to be generated (e.g., the key source 170), the management request handler 205 itself may generate the encryption key. The management request handler 205 may generate the encryption key based on the set of policies 115 stored in the policy database 280. In other words, the management request handler 205 may generate the encryption keys with key attributes 160 that would not have violated any policies 115 set forth in the policy database 280.

Where the request 175 may be silent as to where the encryption key is to be generated (e.g., the key source 170), or specifies that a particular key source 170 to generate the encryption key, the management request handler 205 may retrieve or otherwise request the encryption key from a suitable key source 170. The management request handler 205 may request encryption keys from the management user interface 220, the key federation interface 260, the communication devices (e.g., the cellular device 250 a, network device 250 b, . . . , device N 250 n, source device 150 a, and target device 150 b), key management interface 240, and/or the like.

The management request handler 205 may retrieve encryption keys from a designated database storing encryption keys (e.g., the local key database 270). The local key database 270 may be coupled to other key sources 170 (e.g., the cellular device 250 a, network device 250 b, . . . , device N 250 n, source device 150 a, target device 150 b, the key generation and management device 230 the key federation interface 260, and/or the like) and store cached encryption keys on behalf of the other key sources 170. The management request handler 205 may retrieve encryption keys from the local key database 270 instead of requesting encryption keys from the key sources 170. This is so that transaction time for retrieving/generating the encryption key may be improved, and that network problems would not hinder the ability of the management request handler 205 to obtain encryption keys, given that the local key database may be local to (e.g., residing on a same network node) the management request handler 205. As the management request handler 205 is retrieving encryption keys from the local key database 270, a verification request may be sent to the key source 170 to ensure whether the encryption key to be retrieved has been altered by the key source 170. A confirmation or an updated encryption key may be sent to the local key database 270 in response, so that the management request handler 205 may accordingly receive the encryption key.

In some embodiments, the management request handler 205, upon receiving encryption keys (whether requested or not) in any manner as described, may cache the encryption key along with the key source identifier and the associated key attributes 160 at the local key database 270. The encryption key, the key source identifier, and the key attributes 160 may be stored in case that the communication is lost or when the encryption key source of the encryption key is not authoritative. Whereas in some embodiments, the encryption key may not be transmitted with the key attributes 160. In such embodiments, the management request handler 205 may determine the key attributes 160 from various sources such as, but not limited to, the local user repository 285, the device inventory database 295, and/or the like.

The management request handler 205 may then inspect the key attributes 160 associated with the encryption key received based on the set of policies 115 stored in the policy database 280. The management request handler 205 may retrieve all policies 115 or only the relevant policies (e.g., based on some or all key attributes 160) from the policy database 280. In some embodiments, the encryption keys generated by the management request handler 205 or at the direction of the management request handler 205 may be spared from inspection by policies 115 when they are created based on the policies 115. In other embodiments, all encryption keys generated by the management request handler 205 or at the direction of the management request handler 205 may be inspected by the policies 115. Encryption keys allowable based on the policies 115 may be allowed while unacceptable encryption keys may be denied, in the manner described. The management request handler 205 may be configured to update or add policies stored in the policy database 280 (e.g., as directed by the management user interface 220).

The local user repository 285 may be a database storing information related to local users of the communication devices (e.g., the cellular device 250 a, network device 250 b, device N 250 n, and/or the like) within the enterprise. In various embodiments, the local user repository 285 may store characteristics/information of the users that would constitute key attributes 160. The characteristics include, but not limited to, privileges, security groups, assigned roles, a combination thereof, and/or the like. The security groups may be stored in a hierarchical tree. The management request handler 205 may access the local user repository 285 for such characteristics and utilize them as key attributes 160 associated with encryption keys requested, transmitted, or received by that device corresponding to such characteristics. The management request handler 205 may add or alter information stored in the local user repository 285. A copy of the information stored in the local user repository 285 may be sent to the local key database 270 as key attributes 160 to be stored in the local key database 270.

In some embodiments, the transaction database 275 may store various communication transactions or potential communication transactions. In some embodiments, the transaction database 275 may store encryption key transmission instances (i.e., instances where encryption keys are to be distributed) to one or more devices. For example, when a particular encryption key cannot/should not be forwarded (e.g., pushed to a communication device) for any reason, the forwarding transaction (e.g., a job) may be queued or otherwise stored within the transactions database 275 for forwarding the encryption key at a later some. The transaction database 275 may also store a status of each particular encryption key transmission instance, which may later be read by the request handler 210. For example, the request handler 210 may at a later time attempt to transmit all or some encryption keys to corresponding communication devices for all “unsent” encryption key transmission instances. The transactions database 275 may be coupled to the local key database 270 to gain access of the keys to be forwarded to each communication device that the encryption key may be generated for.

In further embodiments, the transaction database 275 may be coupled to the request handler 210 and may store the communication transactions (for which the encryption key may be requested, transmitted, or received) and/or the associated key attributes 160. For example, the request handler 210 may transmit such information to the transactions database 275. The transaction database 275 may be coupled to the local key database 270. The communication transactions (as the associated details) may be associated with the encryption keys stored in the local key database 270. The management request handler 205 may need to access only the local key database 270 for the encryption keys and the associated key attributes 260.

The configuration database 290 may store supporting instructions for the key applied key management system 200. In some embodiments, the configuration database 290 may store internal network, configuration of clients, configuration of applications, IP address allocations, various component configurations, device privileges, device communication pathways, credentials, and/or the like. The configuration database 290 may be coupled to the management request handler 205, which may require the instructions stored within the configuration database 290 for operations. The management request handler 205 may also add or alter the information stored in the configuration database 290.

In some embodiments, the device inventory database 295 may store information related to the communication devices associated with the given enterprise. For example, information stored may include, but not limited to, security group, security level, geo-location, identification number, internal classification, device specifications, time stamp in which an encryption has been created, a combination thereof, and/or the like. The request handler 210 may be coupled to the device inventory database 295 to store such data therein. The management request handler 205 may be coupled to the device inventory database 295 for accessing such device information. The device inventory database 295 for associating particular cached keys with the corresponding device information as key attributes 160. A copy of the information stored in the device inventory database 295 may be sent to the local key database 270 as key attributes 160.

The key federation interface 260 may allow one applied key management device 110 to federate encryption key information with one or more other applied key management devices 110 (through their associated respective key federation interfaces 260) based on an established trust relationship. Each enterprise may include by an applied key management device 110. As such, the key federation interface 260 may maintain a trust relationship with the communication systems of at least one other enterprise. It is, in other words, a gateway to extend trust.

FIG. 3 illustrates an example of an encryption key federation system 300 as implemented in various embodiments. The key federation system 300 may implement the applied key management device 110 as set forth with respect to FIGS. 1-2. The key federation system 300 may be based on extra-enterprise communication relationship and key federation enabled by the applied key management device 110 (e.g., the management request handler 205 and the associated components).

Encryption keys (e.g., asymmetric encryption keys, symmetric encryption keys, and/or the like) generated by components within one enterprise (e.g., enterprise A 390 a) may be distributed to a disparate applied key management device (e.g., the applied key management device 110, the management request handler 205, and its associated components, and/or the like) of another enterprise (e.g., enterprise B 390 b) pursuant to inspection by the policies 115 of either (or both) enterprises. This can enable secured communications or data exchange with outside entities (e.g., enterprises) based on the federated trust model. This can also allow encryption management to parallel communications management in supporting external communications to enable symmetric key encryption for communications. Accordingly, performance of the communications platform may be improved, given that utilization of asymmetric encryption may be expensive from a processing perspective as compared to symmetric encryption.

In the key federation system 300, each enterprise (e.g., the enterprise A 390 a or the enterprise B 390 b) may be associated with a respective one of an applied key management device A 310 a and an applied key management device B 310 b). Each of the applied key management device A 310 a and the applied key management device B 310 b may be the applied key management device 110. The applied key management device A 310 a and the applied key management device B 310 b may be in communication with one another through any suitable network. In particular, the key federation interfaces (e.g., the key federation interface 260) of each of the applied key management device A 310 a and the applied key management device B 310 b may be in communication with one another.

In various embodiments, the key management server A 330 a and the key management server B 330 b may be a device such as, but not limited to, the key generation and management device 230 and the key management interface 240. Each of the key management server A 330 a and the key management server B 330 b may be coupled to their respective key federation interfaces 206 within their respective enterprises in the manner described.

A device A 350 a and a device B 350 b may attempt to obtain an encryption key for the communication therebetween. Each of the device A 350 a and the device B 350 b may be the source device 150 a, the target device 150 b, the cellular device 250 a, the network device 250 b, . . . , the device N 250 n, a combination thereof, and/or the like.

An encryption key may be generated within one enterprise (e.g., enterprise A 390 a) from any suitable key source 170 in the manner described. The encryption key may be generated by the enterprise A 390 a (e.g., by a key source 170 in the enterprise A 390 a) with or without a request 170 from either enterprise B 390 b or within enterprise A. The encryption key may likewise be generated by the enterprise B 390 b in a similar manner. The encryption key and its associated key attributes 160 may be presented to the policy engine of enterprise A 390 a (e.g., the applied key management device A 310 a, which may include the management request handler 205 and its associated components) for inspection in the manner described. In response to the policy engine of enterprise A 390 a determining the encryption key is accepted based on the encryption key attributes 160, the applied key management device 310 a (e.g., the key federation interface 260) of enterprise A 390 a may relate the encryption key as well as its associated key attributes 160 to the applied key management device B 310 b (e.g., the key federation interface 260) of enterprise B 390 b.

Upon receiving the encryption key and its associated key attributes 160, the encryption key and its associated key attributes 160 may be presented to the policy engine of enterprise B390 b (e.g., the applied key management device B 310 b, which may also include the management request handler 205 and its associated components) for inspection in the manner described. The encryption key may be forwarded to both the device A 350 a and the device B 350 b when the applied key management device B 310 b determines that the encryption key is consistent with its policies 115 defined for enterprise B 390 b. In other words, the encryption key (as defined by its key attributes 160) may be allowed only if it is consistent with both sets of policies 115 of enterprise A 390 a as well as enterprise B 390 b. At least some of the set of policies 115 of enterprise A 390 a may be different from at least some of the set of policies 115 of enterprise B 390 b. Whereas the encryption key is found not allowable by either the applied key management device A 310 a or the applied key management device b 310 b, the encryption key may be returned back to the key source 170 with the “denied” message and/or the hint in the manner described.

In other embodiments, acceptance by policies 115 associated with only one enterprise (e.g., either enterprise A 390 a or enterprise B 390 b) may be sufficient for encryption key to be allowed. In such cases, the trust extends to some or sometimes all of the policies 115. In addition, each enterprise may include a set of policies 115 for the federated instances (e.g., each enterprise may have agreed with the other regarding a set of policies 115 used when communications between the communication devices of the enterprises are to occur. Accordingly, each enterprise may store (e.g., in each respective policy database 280) a same set of federated (mutual and reciprocal) policies for the federated schemes. The federated policies may be the same for both the enterprise A 390 a and the enterprise B 390 b. Thus, allowance by one applied key management device associated with one enterprise may be sufficient for the encryption key to be forwarded for usage for communication between both enterprises.

In various embodiments, enterprise federation policies may be stored within each policy database 280. The enterprise federation policies may specify the manner in which the encryption keys may be federated. For example, the enterprise federation policies may specify the federated policies, which applied key management device may inspect the key attributes 160, which enterprise may issue a request 175 for an encryption key, which enterprise may generate an encryption key, a combination thereof, and/or the like. The enterprise federation policies allow flexibility in policy defining. For example, the enterprise federation policies may specify that enterprises may each include its own policies 115 in addition to the federated policies, where at least a part the policies 115 of each enterprise may be disparate.

In some embodiments, a communication platform A 320 a and a communication platform B 320 b of each respective enterprise may be in communication with one another via any suitable network. Such communication between the communication platforms may be encrypted communications, where the encryption key corresponding to such communication may also be presented for inspection by policies 115 similar to described with respect to the devices (e.g., the device A 350 a, the device B 350 b, and/or the like). Each communication platform may be in communication to a respective device, such that configurations related to the applied key management systems may be exchanged.

FIG. 4 illustrates an example of a communication device 400 consuming applied key management services as part of the enterprise according to some embodiments. Referring to FIGS. 1-4, the communication device 400 may be a device such as, but not limited to, the source device 150 a, the target device 150 b, the cellular device 250 a, the network device 250 b, . . . , the device N 250 n, the device A 350 a, the device B 350 b, a combination thereof, and/or the like. In some embodiments, the communication device 400 leverages applied key management to receive encryption keys (or key updates) associated with applications such as, but not limited to, an Email application 410 a, voice-over-internet protocol (VOIP) application 410 b, storage encryption 410 c, and/or other encryption applications 410 d on the communication device 400.

The communication device 400 may be registered with an applied key management platform to receive applied key management services. The communication device 400 may provide an application interface 420 based configured to receive with encryption key distribution and encryption key management messages (e.g., the “allowed” message, the “denied” message, the hint, and/or the like) from the applied key management device 110. The application interface 420 may be coupled to each of the Email application 410 a, voice-over-internet protocol (VOIP) application 410 b, storage encryption 410 c, and/or other encryption applications 410 d to forward the accepted encryption key to them.

This communication device 400 may also utilize KMIP by a KMIP proxy 430 to receive KMIP type commands from the applied key management device 110. The KMIP proxy 430 may be connected to the key store 440 for managing the encryption keys stored therein. The KMIP proxy 430 may also be connected to a device-end cryptographic unit 450. The device-end cryptographic unit 450 may be configured to generate encryption keys. In response to the “denied” message, the device-end cryptographic unit 450 may generated a different encryption key to present to the policy engine for inspection. Whereas the hint is given, the device-end cryptographic unit 450 may generate a different encryption key based on the hint. The device-end cryptographic unit 450 may cache its encryption keys in the key store 440. The device-end cryptographic unit 450 may be coupled to the application interface 420. The application interface 420 may transmit the encryption keys generated along with the key attributes 160 to the policy engine and forward the response of the policy engine to the device-end cryptographic unit 450 e.g., when the response is negative.

Accordingly, operation-level policy inspection may be achieved. Given that the communication device 400 may be capable to interact with the policy engine regarding the encryption keys, the ability to service the request for an encryption key (or inspect the encryption key) by a third-party device (e.g., the policy engine residing in the applied key management device 110) acting as administrating may be achieved. The request 175 for an encryption key or the encryption key may be serviced each communication transaction.

FIG. 5 illustrates an example of a request authentication process 500 for issuing requests 175 for encryption keys in various applied key management systems according to some embodiments. The request authentication process 500 may be internal to the applied key management device 110, when the applied key management device 110 (e.g., the management request handler 205, the applied key management device A 310 a, the applied key management device B 310 b, and/or the like) itself generates the encryption keys. In other embodiments, the request authentication process 500 may be external to the applied key management device 110 to support integration with existing key management and key generation infrastructure (e.g., the key generation and management device 230, the key management server A 330 a, the key management server B 330 b, and/or the like).

First, at block B510, the applied key management device 110 may provide authentication information to a key source 170. As described, such key source 170 may be the applied key management device 110 itself, the key generation and management device 230, the management user interface 220, the key federation interface 260, the communication devices (e.g., the cellular device 250 a, network device 250 b, . . . , device N 250 n, source device 150 a, target device 150 b, device A 350 a, device B 350 b, communication device 400, a combination thereof, and/or the like), and/or other external key sources. The authentication information may be any suitable authentication method, such as username/passcode request, security handshake algorithms, biometric request, a combination thereof, and/or the like.

Next, at block B520, the applied key management device 110 may receive authentication response from the key source 170. The applied key management device 110 may authenticate the response and establish trusted relationship between the key source 170 and the applied key management device 110. Next at block B530, the applied key management device 110, the management user interface 220, the key generation and management device 230, the communication devices, and other API calls may issue a key management/generation request (e.g., the request 175) to the key source 170. In some embodiments, the applied key management device 110 may forward the request 175 from a trusted third party (e.g., the communication devices, the management user interface 220, the key federation interface 260, and/or other third-party devices) to the key source 170. In some embodiments, the request 175 may be directly sent to the key source 170. The applied key management device 110 may be configured to determine whether to generate encryption keys itself or forward the request to another key source 170 when the request 175 does not identify the key source 170. Next, at block B540, the applied key management device 110 may receive response (e.g., the encryption keys as requested) from the key source 170.

Subsequently, the encryption keys obtained by the applied key management device 110 may be evaluated based on the key attributes 160 and the policies 115 in the manner described. When allowed, the encryption keys may be distributed to the communication devices associated with the corresponding communication transaction. When denied, the applied key management device 110 may transmit the “denied” message (and in some instances, the hint) and standby for new encryption keys.

In some embodiments, multiple requests may be sent to a plurality of key sources 170, each request may correspond to a single communication transaction. In response, the multiple responses (e.g., encryption keys) may be received from the key sources 170. In other embodiments, multiple requests may be sent to a plurality of key sources 170, where two or more requests may correspond to a same communication transaction. As the applied key management device 110 may receive two or more encryption keys from the key sources 170. The applied key management device 110 may determine one of the two or more encryption keys for the communication transaction based on the policies 115 (e.g., the most secure out of the two or more encryption keys).

Accordingly, large scale distribution by the applied key management device 110 may be possible in systems including at least one source for the encryption keys and multiple recipient communication devices.

FIG. 6 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of a communication device registration process 600 implemented in various applied key management systems according to various embodiments. Blocks B610, B620, B630 may be executed simultaneously or sequentially in that order. First, at block B610 the communication device may be discovered (e.g., by the request handler 210). The request handler 210 may detect that the communication device is present within the enterprise (e.g., the networks associated with the enterprise) automatically.

At block B620, the communication device may be registered (e.g., by the request handler 210). In some embodiments, configuration information related to the applied key management systems may be transmitted to the communication device. Device information of the communication device may be transmitted to the local user repository 285, device inventory database 295, and/or the like. At block B630, the communication device may be enrolled (e.g., by the request handler 210). For example, the communication device may transmit a server authentication request the request handler 210 and receiving a positive authorization response.

Next, at block B640, the communication device may be accepted (e.g., by the request handler 210). For example, the request handler 210 and/or the management request handler 205 may check existing policies 115 based on the device information to determine whether the communication device has been classified in the appropriate group, whether the applied key management device 110 may be capable of managing the communication device, a combination thereof, and/or the like.

Next, at block B650, the request handler 210 may provide device authentication information to the communication device. The authentication information may include configurations (e.g., credentials, passcodes, and/or the like) to access the applied key management device 110. Next, at block B660, the request handler 210 and/or the management request handler 205 may define applied key management rules for the communication device. Following block B660 at block B670 a corresponding identifier, the commination device has been added to an applied key management registration. Subsequently, the communication device may request for encryption keys, generate encryption keys, receive approved encryption keys, and/or the like in the manner described. Such process ensures that the communication device utilizing services provided by the applied key management device 110 may meet the operable standards of the applied key management device 110.

FIG. 7 illustrates an example of a key management and distribution process 700 according to various embodiments. Referring to FIGS. 1-7, the key management and distribution process 700 may be implemented with communication devices registered, discovered, and/or enrolled with the applied key management device 110.

First, at block B710, the management request handler 205 may define key management command. A key management command may be a particularized command for a key management event (e.g., “job”). The key management event may be an event triggering a set of algorithms to create encryption keys based on the policies 115 and distribute (e.g., push) the encryption keys to at least one of the communication devices (e.g., the cellular device 250 a, network device 250 b, . . . , device N 250 n, source device 150 a, target device 150 b, device A 350 a, device B 350 b, communication device 400, a combination thereof, and/or the like).

In some embodiments, the key management event may be based on time. For example, the management request handler 205 may be configured to rekey for at least some (sometimes all) of the communication devices associated with the enterprise (or another enterprise) periodically (e.g., every day, every week, every month, and/or the like). In various embodiments, the key management event may occur automatically through an API call. The API call may be issued from any components internal and/or external to the applied key management device 110 within a same or disparate enterprise.

The key management event may also be user-defined. For example, the management user interface 220 may receive user input from the designated user to generate encryption keys immediately for at least one communication device. In such examples, such user-defined key management events may be initiated in response to a sudden event, including cyber-attacks, security breaches, change to the polices 115, and/or the like. The management user interface 220 may also alter the policies 115 stored within the policy database 280 in response to these key management events. The new encryption keys created must follow the altered set of policies 115.

The key management command may include providing encryption key to some or all communication devices within the same or a disparate enterprise, re-transmitting a same or different encryption key to some or all communication devices within the same or disparate enterprise, a combination thereof, and/or the like. In various embodiments, the management request handler 205 may define for a plurality of key management commands, each of which may correspond to a communication transaction and/or communication device associated with the enterprise. In further embodiments, the management request handler 205 may define key management commands for communication devices associated with a disparate enterprise when allowed by the federation model. The management commands (e.g., encryption keys) may be transmitted via the key federation interfaces 260 associated with each enterprise.

Next, at block B720, the management request handler 205 may build a key management command queue. A job created in response to the key management event may include a plurality of key management commands, each of which may correspond to a communication device and/or a communication transaction. Accordingly, where the key management commands are generating new encryption keys and distributing to two or more communication devices, the key management commands may be queued (e.g., stored within the transactions database 275) for execution, given the volume of the key management commands. As such, a composite command may correspond to key management commands for multiple key sources to issue encryption keys to multiple encryption key receiving communication devices. The composite command may be associated with a plurality of key management commands, and may be stored as a whole in the transaction database 275 awaiting distribution. Thus, even if a server (e.g., the management request handler 205) is shut off before all the key management commands are executed/distributed, the process may resume as soon as the sever is switched on.

Key management command associated with inactive communication devices (e.g., communication devices that may be turned off and/or off the network) may be stored in the transactions database 275 for future distribution (e.g., when the inactive communication devices are switched on) by the management request handler 205 at block B730. On the other hand, for active devices (e.g., communication devices that may be turned on and/or on the network), the key management command may be executed by the management request handler 205 at block B740.

For example, the management request handler 205 may request encryption keys from key sources 170 based on the key management commands at block B750. For example, the key management commands may specify one or more key sources 170 to issue encryption keys to the communication devices. Accordingly, some communication devices may receive encryption keys from a first key source while other communication devise may receive encryption keys from a second different key source. Next, at block B760, the management request handler 205 may distribute encryption keys to the communication devices. In some embodiments, the management request handler 205 may perform encryption key inspection based on the key attributes 160 and the set of policies 115 in the manner described. Once approved, the management request handler 205 may forward the encryption keys to the corresponding communication devices through the request handler 210.

Next, at block B770, the management request handler 205 may receive response to the distribution from the communication devices. For example, the management request handler 205 may determine, based on the responses of the communication devices, whether such distribution was successful at block B780. Whereas the management request handler 205 determines that the distribution was successful with respect to a given communication device (e.g., that communication device has received the encryption key distributed to it), positive feedback may be provided to the management request handler 205 at block B795.

On the other hand, whereas the management request handler 205 determines that the distribution was unsuccessful (e.g., that communication device has not received the encryption key distributed to it) for a given communication device, a negative response of that communication device may be provided to the management request handler 205 at block B790. The management request handler 205 may then determine whether to attempt to execute the key management command again at a later time for that communication device based on preexisting algorithms or user input at block B798.

When management request handler 205 determines that execution of the key management commands (e.g., the distribution of the encryption) is not to be attempted again (B798:NO), the process ends. On the other hand, whereas the management request handler 205 determines that key management commands not successfully distributed are to be attempted again (B798:YES), the key management commands may be stored at block B730 (e.g., in the transactions database 275) for future distribution.

In some embodiments, when distribution of the key management commands may be unsuccessful, the management request handler 205 may determine to retry distribution of the unsuccessful key management commands (B780:RETRY). For example, the management request handler 205 may again execute key management commands for active devices at block B740.

FIG. 8 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key federation process 800 according to various embodiments. Referring to FIGS. 1-8, applied key management devices 110 (e.g., both in a same local enterprise and in a foreign enterprise) may mutually authenticate and distribute encryption keys based on the policies 115 implemented for applied key management devices 110 or each enterprise for federating encryption keys from one enterprise to another enterprise. In addition, the encryption key federation process 800 may also include the receiving of encryption keys from a foreign applied key management device as a result of the federation policy of the foreign applied key management device.

First, at block B810, the local applied key management device (e.g., the applied key management device A 310 a) may provide authentication information to a foreign applied key management device (e.g., the applied key management device B 310 b). The authentication information may be any suitable authentication prompt and/or request for federation. Next, at block B820, the local applied key management device may receive authentication response from the foreign applied key management device agreeing to initiation the federation model. The blocks B810 and B820 may represent typical security credential handshakes, where federation trust has been established between the two enterprises.

Next, at block B830, the local applied key management device may provide trust policy information to the foreign applied key management device. At block B840, the local applied key management device may receive trust policy information from the foreign applied key management device. The trust policy information may include any configurations, settings, extent of trust, mutually agreed policies, a combination thereof, and/or the like.

Next, at block B850, the local applied key management device and the foreign applied key management device may manage and distribute key information (e.g., the encryption key, the associated key attributes 160, a combination thereof, and/or the like) in the manner described.

In particular embodiments, the foreign applied key management device transmit the request 175 to the local applied key management device for generating the encryption key for a communication transaction between a communication device associated with the foreign applied key management device and a communication device associated with the local applied key management device. The encryption key may be generated by the local applied key management device and inspected by local policy engine. The encryption key may be transmitted to the foreign applied key management device for inspection by the foreign policy engine in some embodiments, but not others.

In some embodiments, instead of the request 175, the foreign applied key management device may transmit a generated encryption key (which may or may not have been inspected by policy engine of the foreign applied key management device depending on trust policy information specified). The local applied key management device may or may not inspect the encryption key and its associated key attributes 160 by policies 115 based on the trust policy information specified between the enterprises.

FIG. 9 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key management and distribution process 900 according to various embodiments. In various embodiments, the encryption key management and distribution process 900 may incorporate elements of applied key management, including key management, key distribution, and key federation.

First, at block B910, a set of policies 115 may be defined, where each policy 115 may relate to one or more key attributes 160. The policies 115 may be defined by designed personnel and stored in the policy database 280 for future retrieval and update. Next, at block B920, the management request handler 205 may receive encryption key and at least one key attribute associated with the encryption key from the key source 170 in the manner described.

Next, at block B930, the management request handler 205 may determine acceptability of the encryption key received based, at least in part, on the at least one key attribute and the set of policies 115 that relate to one of the at least one key attribute. For example, the management request handler 205 may check a value corresponding to a key attribute 160 to determine whether the value is within an acceptable range as defined by the policies 115 in the manner described.

Next, at block B940, the management request handler 205 may determine whether the encryption key is acceptable. Whereas the encryption key is acceptable (B940:YES), the management request handler 205 may distribute the encryption key to the communication devices requiring the key for the communication transaction therebetween, at block B950. On the other hand, whereas the encryption key is unacceptable (B940:NO), the management request handler 205 may transmit the “denied” message to the key source 170 at block B960. Optionally, the management request handler 205 may transmit the hint to the key source to facilitate key generation at block B970. The management request handler 205 may then standby until receiving a second encryption key (and associated key attributes 160) at block B920.

The applied key management system (e.g., the applied key management device 110, the management request handler 205, applied key management device A 310 a, applied key management device B 310 b, and/or the like) described herein may be implemented on any suitable computing devices having a processor and a memory device. The processor may include any suitable data processing device, such as a general-purpose processor (e.g., a microprocessor), but in the alternative, the processor may be any conventional processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine. The processor may also be implemented as a combination of computing devices, e.g., a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, at least one microprocessor in conjunction with a DSP core, or any other such configuration. The memory may be operatively coupled to the processor and may include any suitable device for storing software and data for controlling and use by the processor to perform operations and functions described herein, including, but not limited to, random access memory RAM, read only memory ROM, floppy disks, hard disks, dongles or other RSB connected memory devices, or the like.

The applied key management device 110, the management request handler 205, applied key management device A 310 a, and/or applied key management device B 310 b may be implemented on suitable operating systems (OS) such as, but not limited to, the Linux OS, Windows, the Mac OS, and the like. Additionally, the applied key management device 110, the management request handler 205, applied key management device A 310 a, and/or applied key management device B 310 b may be implemented on small form factors such as embedded systems.

The embodiments described herein relate to encryptions keys. It should be appreciated by one of ordinary skills in the art that, in other embodiments, the systems and methods directed to the applied key management device 110 involving management, distribution, and federation may be likewise implemented for other sensitive objects such as, but not limited to, user identity information, certificates, biometric data, random number generator data, determinate random number generator data, non-determinate random number generator data, user authentication information, policy components, other components associated with organization security component, and/or the like.

Some embodiments described herein relate to providing an interface (e.g., an applied key management client interface) to a client (e.g., a communication device) for integrating or otherwise connecting with an applied key management server or system to allow secure distribution of public keys from a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) while having minimal impact on existing technology of the client. Through the integration or connection, the applied key management system may access a local key store of the client to determine whether a public key for a recipient of a communication (e.g., email) is available. Illustrating with a non-limiting example, an applied key management client interface may integrate with email services of a client to allow access to automated distribution of public keys to the client. Other communication services or applications such as, but not limited to, messages may likewise benefit from the applied key management client interface. The applied key management system may interface with the client on one end and PKI services on another end, acting as an intermediary between the client and the PKI services. The PKI services may include, but not limited to, a Certificate Authority, Intermediate Certificate Authority, Issuing Authority, or other PKI services.

In some embodiments, the applied key management client interface provided to the client may be a Microsoft Windows Service, Linux Daemon, or other suitable interfaces for providing a platform for local activities at the client and to provide an integration point with the applied key management system. An application-specific plugin (e.g., an email client plugin) may be provided to query a local key store in the client for determining whether a recipient's public key needs to be requested. Thus, the combination of the applied key management client interface and the plugin can allow automated requests for public keys based on need.

FIG. 10 is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of relationship between a communication device 1000, applied key management system 1010, and PKI 1020 according to various embodiments. Referring to FIGS. 1-10, the communication device 1000 may be the client. In some embodiments, the communication device 1000 may be a device such as, but not limited to, the source device 150 a, the target device 150 b, the cellular device 250 a, the network device 250 b, . . . , the device N 250 n, the device A 350 a, the device B 350 b, a combination thereof, and/or the like. The applied key management system 1010 may be a server or system such as, but not limited to, the general applied key management system 100, applied key management system 200, and/or the like.

In some embodiments, the PKI 1020 may be any key source infrastructure that the applied key management system 1010 may be in communication with for obtaining public keys requested by the communication device 1000. For example, the PKI 1020 may include any suitable key source including, but not limited to, a Certificate Authority, Intermediate Certificate Authority, Issuing Authority, or other suitable PKI services. The PKI 1020 may utilize Public-Key Cryptography Standard #11, KMIP, or other Certificate Authority services with which the applied key management system 1010 can interface and communicate via the PKI interface 1260 (FIG. 12).

In some embodiments, the communication device 1000 may determine whether public keys (e.g., recipient's public keys) may be needed to encrypt an email and send a request for the public keys to the applied key management system 1010. The applied key management system 1010 may determine whether the request is authorized according to the policies 115. In response to determining that the request is authorized, the applied key management system 1010 may communicate with the PKI 1020 to obtain the requested public keys. The applied key management system 1010 may send the requested public keys back to the communication device 1000.

The communication device 1000 may be connected to the applied key management system 1010 via any suitable first (wired or wireless) network link. The applied key management system 1010 may be connected to the PKI 1020 via any suitable second (wired or wireless) network link. The network links may be secured or unsecured. For example, the network links may each be a wide area communication network, such as, but not limited to, the internet, or one or more intranets, local area networks (LANs), ethernet networks, metropolitan area networks (MANs), a wide area network (WAN), combinations thereof, or the like. In particular embodiments, the network links may represent one or more secure network links configured with suitable security features, such as, but not limited to firewalls, encryption, or other software or hardware configurations that inhibits access to network communications by unauthorized personnel or entities.

FIG. 11 is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of the communication device 1000 of FIG. 10 according to some embodiments. Referring to FIGS. 1-11, the communication device 1000 may include an email application 1105, email client plugin 1110, applied key management client interface 1120, file kernel driver 1125, and local key store 1130 in some embodiments. In some embodiments, the communication device 1000 may correspond to the communication device 400. For example, the email application 1105 may correspond to the email application 410 a. The local key store 1130 may correspond to key store 440. The email client plugin 1110 may correspond to the application interface 420. The applied key management client interface 1120 may correspond to support configurations and/or interfaces between the KMIP Proxy 430 and one or more of the application interface 420, key store 440, or device end cryptographic unit 450.

In some embodiments, the communication device 1000 may be a desktop computer, mainframe computer, server computer, laptop computer, pad device, smart phone device or the like, configured with hardware and software to perform operations described herein. For example, the communication device 1000 may include a typical desktop Personal Computer (PC) or Apple™ computer devices, having suitable processing capabilities, memory, user interface (e.g., display and input) capabilities, and communication capabilities, when configured with suitable application software (or other software) to perform operations described herein. Thus, particular embodiments may be implemented, using processor devices that are often already present in many business and organization environments, by configuring such devices with suitable software processes described herein. Accordingly, such embodiments may be implemented with minimal additional hardware costs. However, other embodiments of the communication device 1000 may include to dedicated device hardware specifically configured for performing operations described herein.

In some embodiments, the email client plugin 1110 may be an integration point between the email application 1105 and the applied key management client interface 1120. The email client plugin 1110 may access the local key store 1130 to determine whether a public key (e.g., a recipient's public key) associated with the email application 1105 is available. In response to determining that a public key is not available for a given recipient, the email client plugin 1110 may notify the applied key management client interface 1120 to initiate a request for the public key. In some embodiments, the email client plugin 1110 may determine that a public key is not available in response to determining one or more of the public key not being present in the local key store 1130, the public key being expired and thus needing renewal, the public key being revoked, and/or the like.

Illustrating with a non-limiting example, the email client plugin 1110 may query the local key store 1130 to determine whether a public key is present, needs to be renewed, revoked, and/or the like. The public key may be present if the public key is found in the local key store 1130. The public key needs to be renewed if the public key has expired. The email client plugin 1110 may check a Certificate Revocation List associated with a public key stored in the local key store 1130 to determine whether the public key has been revoked. Alternatively or in addition, the email client plugin 1110 may use an Online Certificate Status Protocol request to determine whether a public key has been revoked.

In some embodiments, the local key store 1130 may be a memory device (e.g., a cache, a database, and/or the like) used to store security objects such as public keys on the communication device 1000. In some embodiments, the email application 1105 may use the public keys stored in the local key store 1130. Illustrating with a non-limiting example, the local key store 1130 may be a Microsoft key store, Mozilla key store, and/or the like.

In some embodiments, the applied key management client interface 1120 may be a communication component (e.g., a service module or daemon) of the communication device 1000 for communicating with the applied key management system 1010. The applied key management client interface 1120 may be provided to the communication device 1000 as a software component for installation and/or update to enable interfacing with the applied key management system 1010, given that the communication device 1000 may not have capacity to support direct communication with the applied key management system 1010 natively.

The applied key management client interface 1120 may communicate with one or more of the email client plugin 1110, local key store 1130, or the applied key management system 1010 (e.g., an applied key management server interface 1210 of FIG. 12) via Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol, or the like. In some embodiments, the applied key management client interface 1120 may communicate with one or more of the email client plugin 1110, local key store 1130, or the applied key management system 1010 (e.g., an applied key management server interface 1210 shown in FIG. 12) via KMIP protocol or other suitable communication protocols.

In some embodiments, the applied key management client interface 1120 may support key management operations on the communication device 1000 such as, but not limited to, sending requests for obtaining public keys or rekeying requests to the applied key management system 1010. In some embodiments, the applied key management client interface 1120 may be connected to the local key store 1130 for distributing (e.g., adding, manipulating, writing, or inserting) encryption keys obtained from the applied key management system 1010 to the local key store 1130, to be used for the email application 1105. The applied key management client interface 1120 may send the requests in response to the email client plugin 1110 determining that a public key is not available.

In some embodiments, the file kernel driver 1125 may be a driver and/or kernel for establishing connection with the applied key management system 1010. In other words, the file kernel driver 1125 may be a software module for providing configurations related to file access operations concerning security objects such as encryption keys (e.g., public keys). In particular, the file kernel driver 1125 may configure the applied key management client interface 1120 to communicate with the applied key management system 1010 via KMIP-based or class X-based connections. The file kernel driver 1125 may configure the applied key management client interface 1120 to send the request to the applied key management system 1010 in some embodiments.

In some embodiments, the file kernel driver 1125 may configure the applied key management client interface 1120 to open connection with the applied key management system 1010, read or get a file from the applied key management system 1010, register/enroll the communication device 1000 with the applied key management system 1010 (in a manner such as, but not limited to, described with respect to the communication device registration process 600), close connection with the applied key management system 1010, and/or the like. Illustrating with a non-limiting example, the file kernel driver 1125 may be a Linux Kernel Driver, Windows File Driver, or the like. The file kernel driver 1125 may be connected to the applied key management client interface via an interface such as, but not limited to, Netlink.

One or more of the email application 1105, email client plugin 1110, applied key management client interface 1120, or file kernel driver 1125 may be implemented by a processor 1140. The processor 1140 may include any suitable data processing device, such as a general-purpose processor (e.g., a microprocessor). In the alternative, the processor 1140 may be any conventional processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine. The processor 1140 may also be implemented as a combination of computing devices, e.g., a combination of a Digital Signal Processor (DSP) and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, at least one microprocessor in conjunction with a DSP core, or any other such configuration. The processor 1140 may be configured with processor-readable instructions to perform features and functions of various components of the communication device 1000 as described herein.

A memory 1150 may be operatively coupled to the processor 1140 and may include any suitable non-transitory computer-readable device for storing software and data for controlling the processor 1140 to perform operations and functions described herein. The memory 1150 may include, but not limited to, a Random Access Memory (RAM), Read Only Memory (ROM), floppy disks, hard disks, dongles, or Recomp Sensory Board (RSB) connected memory devices, or the like. In some embodiments, the memory 1150 may be implemented with cloud storage. In some embodiments, local key store 1130 may be separate from the memory 1150. In other embodiments, the local key store 1130 may be a part of the memory 1150.

In some embodiments, the communication device 1000 may include a user interface 1160. The user interface 1160 may include at least one output device. The output device may include any suitable device that provides a human-perceptible visible signal, audible signal, tactile signal, or any combination thereof, including, but not limited to a touchscreen, Liquid Crystal Display (LCD), Light Emitting Diode (LED), Cathode Ray Tube (CRT), plasma, or other suitable display screen, audio speaker or other audio generating device, combinations thereof, or the like.

In some embodiments, the user interface 1160 may include at least one input device that provides an interface for operator (such as enterprise employees, technicians, or other authorized users) to access the communication device 1000. The input device may include any suitable device that receives input from a user including, but not limited to, one or more manual operator (such as, but not limited to a switch, button, touchscreen, knob, mouse, keyboard, keypad, slider or the like), microphone, or the like. In some embodiments, the input device may allow the operator to input information for sending an email with one or more email recipients.

While the embodiments described herein relate to the email application 1105 and the email client plugin 1110, the applied key management client interface 1120 may likewise be implemented with other suitable applications on the communication device 1000 (400), including, but not limited to, the VOIP application 410 b, storage encryption 410 c, and/or other encryption applications 410 d coupled to the application interface 420.

FIG. 12 is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of an applied key management system 1010 according to some embodiments. Referring to FIGS. 1-12, the applied key management system 1010 may include an applied key management server interface 1210, request agent 1220, action module 1230, policy engine 1240, agent 1250, and PKI interface 1260. In some embodiments, the applied key management system 1010 may correspond to the applied key management system 200 in some embodiments. For example, the applied key management server interface 1210 may correspond to the request handler 210. The request agent 1220, action module 1230, policy engine 1240, and agent 1250 may be implemented with the management request handler 205.

In some embodiments, the applied key management server interface 1210 may communicate with the communication device 1000 (e.g., the applied key management client interface 1120) via TCP, TLS protocol, SSL protocol, or the like. The applied key management server interface 1210 may receive communications (e.g., requests) from the communication device 1000. In some embodiments, the request may include an email address or an account identifier identifying the recipient whose public key may be unavailable at the communication device 1000.

The applied key management server interface 1210 may send key information related to public keys obtained from the PKI 1020 to the communication device 1000. In some embodiments, the applied key management server interface 1210 may have capacity to communicate with multiple devices such as, but not limited to, the communication device 1000 for the activities described herein, enabling an “N-to-1” interface. The applied key management server interface 1210 may send the received request for a public key to the request agent 1220.

In some embodiments, the request agent 1220 may receive the request for a public key from the applied key management server interface 1210 and generate an action request (or job request) based on the request. In other words, the request agent 1220 may be an interface between the applied key management server interface 1210 and the action module 1230. The action request may correspond to the request of the communication device 1000 for obtaining a public key. For example, the action request may include one or more of an email address or account identifier identifying the recipient whose public key may be unavailable or an identifier representing the communication device 1000.

In some embodiments, an action module 1230 may receive the action request sent by the request agent 1220 and process the action request. For example, the action module 1230 may send information included in the action request to the policy engine 1240 for evaluation based on the policies 115. In response to determining that a public key can be authorized for the communication device 1000, the action module 1230 may send a request to the PKI 1020 through the PKI interface 1260. An agent 1250 may be coupled to the action module 1230 to provide configuration for the action module 1230. In some embodiments, the agent 1250 may perform some or all of the functions of the action module 1230 described herein.

In some embodiments, the action module 1230 may include a job management module, job module, and transaction module. The job management module may control creation, updating, executing, and deletion of the jobs. In some embodiments, the job management module may present the action request for inspection by the policy engine 1240 based on the policies 115. In particular, the policy engine 1240 may determine whether the communication device 1000 identified by the identifier is authorized to request a public key based on the relevant policies 115 stored in the policy database 280 or a cache memory. In response to determining that the communication device 1000 is authorized, the job management module may generate an action based on the action request and send the action to the job module.

In some embodiments, the job module may manage a composite set of actions (e.g., various queued actions) for various devices, including the communication device 1000. For each action in a queue maintained by the job module, the job module may create a transaction to connect to a given PKI for obtaining a public key. The job module may group two or more of the transactions into composite transactions. Illustrating with a non-limiting example, transactions to obtain public keys from a same PKI may be grouped into a composite transaction. Illustrating with another non-limiting example, transactions to obtain public keys in a given time interval may be grouped into a composite transaction. Illustrating with yet another non-limiting example, transactions to obtain public keys for a same device (e.g., the communication device 1000) may be grouped into a composite transaction. In some embodiments, the job module may present the composite transactions and/or singular transactions to the policy engine 1240 for evaluation based on the policies 115. In response to determining that a given transaction is authorized based on the policies 115, the job module may send the transaction to the transaction module for execution.

The transaction module may receive the transaction from the job module and execute the transaction. For example, the transaction module may request the PKI 1020 via the PKI interface 1260 to issue a public key requested by the communication device 1000. In response to determining that the transaction cannot be completed or in response to determining that the transaction fails, the transaction module may present the failure to the policy engine 1240 for evaluation based on the policies 115. The policies 115 may indicate a post-failure transaction based on one or more of a type of failure, the identity of the communication device 1000, the identity of the particular PKI, or the like. Post-failure transaction may be, for example, retransmitting the request to the PKI infrastructure periodically for the next 10 seconds if the failure is a communication failure (e.g., faulty network connection) to reach a Certificate Authority known to be currently active. In another example, the post-failure transaction may be sending the communication device 1000 a failure message if a Certificate Authority is currently offline or if the policies 115 do not authorize obtaining the public key.

The PKI interface 1260 may be any suitable interface that can connect with the PKI 1020. The PKI interface 1260 may send requests to the PKI 1020 for obtaining a public key. The PKI interface 1260 may receive the requested public key from the PKI 1020. The PKI interface 1260 may receive a failure message from the PKI 1020 in the event that the PKI 1020 cannot issue the requested public key.

In response to receiving a public key from the PKI 1020, the PKI interface 1260 may relay the public key information to the action module 1230. The action module 1230 may relay the public key information to the request agent 1220. The request agent 1220 may relay the public key information to the applied key management server interface 1210, which may send the public key information to the communication device 1000.

In response to receiving a failure message from the PKI 1020 indicating that the PKI 1020 cannot issue the requested public key, the PKI interface 1260 may relay the failure message to the action module 1230. The action module 1230 may relay the failure message to the request agent 1220. The request agent 1220 may relay the failure message to the applied key management server interface 1210, which may send the failure message to the communication device 1000.

One or more of the applied key management server interface 1210, request agent 1220, action module 1230, policy engine 1240, agent 1250, or PKI interface 1260 may be implemented by a processor 1270. The processor 1270 may include any suitable data processing device, such as a general-purpose processor (e.g., a microprocessor). In the alternative, the processor 1270 may be any conventional processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine. The processor 1270 may also be implemented as a combination of computing devices, e.g., a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, at least one microprocessor in conjunction with a DSP core, or any other such configuration. The processor 1270 may be configured with processor-readable instructions to perform features and functions of various components of the applied key management system 1010 as described herein.

A memory 1280 may be operatively coupled to the processor 1270 and may include any suitable non-transitory computer-readable device for storing software and data for controlling the processor 1270 to perform operations and functions described herein. The memory 1280 may include, but not limited to, a RAM, ROM, floppy disks, hard disks, dongles, or RSB connected memory devices, or the like. In some embodiments, the memory 1280 may be implemented with cloud storage.

FIG. 13 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key request method 1300 according to various embodiments. Referring to FIGS. 1-13, the encryption key request method 1300 may be performed by the processor 1140 of the communication device 1000 according to some embodiments. At block B1310, the processor 1140 (e.g., the email client plugin 1110) may determine whether a public key is available in the local key store 1130 in some embodiments. For example, the processor 1140 (e.g., the email client plugin 1110) may search the local key store 1130 for a public key associated with each recipient on a list of email recipients for an email. Each recipient may be identified by an email address. A public key may be unavailable for a particular recipient in one or more of the following situations: the public key may not be present (may not be currently stored) in the local key store 1130, the public key in the local key store 1130 may need to be renewed, the public key in the local key store 1130 may be currently revoked, or the like.

In some embodiments, the processor 1140 may determine whether the public key is unavailable for a recipient (B1310) in response to the operator committing to transmit the email. The operator may commit to transmit the email by, for example, pressing a “send” button via the input device of the user interface 1160. In other embodiments, the processor 1140 may determine whether the public key is unavailable for a recipient (B1310) in response to the operator adding the recipient (e.g., the email address of the recipient) as one of the recipients of the email, but before the operator commits to transmit the email.

In response to determining the public key being available (B1310:NO) for a given recipient, the processor 1140 (e.g., the email client plugin 1110) may indicate to the email application 1105 to use the public key stored in the local key store 1130 for sending the email to that recipient, at block B1320.

On the other hand, in response to determining that the public key is unavailable (B1310:YES), the processor 1140 may send a request for the public key to the applied key management system 1010, at block B1330. For example, the email client plugin 1110 may signal the applied key management client interface 1120 to initiate a request for the public key associated with the recipient. In response, the applied key management client interface 1120 may send the request to the applied key management system 1010. In some embodiments, the request may include an email address or account identifier identifying the recipient whose public key may be unavailable. In other embodiments, the processor 1140 may send the request in response to the operator committing to transmit the email.

Illustrating with a non-limiting example, in response to determining that the public key for a given recipient is not present in the local key store 1130, the processor 1140 may send a request for the public key associated with the recipient to the applied key management system 1010.

Illustrating with another non-limiting example, in response to determining that the public key for a given recipient may need to be renewed, the processor 1140 may send a request for a new public key (corresponding to the public key needing renewal) associated with the recipient to the applied key management system 1010.

Illustrating with yet another non-limiting example, in response to determining that the public key for a given recipient has been revoked, the processor 1140 may send a request for a public key (corresponding to the revoked public key) associated with the email recipient to the applied key management system 1010 in some embodiments. In additional or alternative embodiments, the processor 1140 may notify the email sender (e.g., the operator of the communication device 1000) of the revocation. The processor 1140 (e.g., the email client plugin 1110) may configure the output device of the user interface 1160 to display a visual message, output an audio message, or otherwise generate any suitable audiovisual or tactile feedback to the operator notifying the operator of the revocation.

The processor 1140 (e.g., the email client plugin 1110) may check a Certificate Revocation List associated with a public key stored in the local key store 1130 to determine whether the public key has been revoked. Alternatively or in addition, the processor 1140 (e.g., the email client plugin 1110) may use an Online Certificate Status Protocol request to determine whether the public key has been revoked.

At block B1340, the processor 1140 (e.g., the applied key management client interface 1120) may determine whether the public key has been received from the applied key management system 1010 in some embodiments. In response to determining that the public key has been received (B1340:YES), the processor 1140 (e.g., the applied key management client interface 1120) may use the received public key, at block B1360. For example, the processor 1140 (e.g., the applied key management client interface 1120) may add the public key received from the applied key management system 1010 to the local key store 1130. In response, the email application 1105 may retrieve the received public key from the local key store 1130 and encrypt the email being sent to the recipient with the public key.

On the other hand, in response to determining that the public key has not been successfully received (B1340:NO), the processor 1140 (e.g., the applied key management client interface 1120) may notify the email sender (e.g., the operator of the communication device 1000) of the failure. For instance, the processor 1140 (e.g., the email client plugin 1110) may configure the output device of the user interface 1160 to display a visual message, output an audio message, or otherwise generate any suitable audiovisual or tactile feedback to the operator notifying the operator of the failure.

FIG. 14 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key request method 1400 according to various embodiments. Referring to FIGS. 1-14, each of blocks B1410-B1430 may correspond to one or more of blocks B1310-B1360. At block B1410, the processor 1140 may request a public key from the applied key management system 1010 for an application (e.g., the email application 1105). The public key may be associated with a recipient of the application. The public key for the recipient may be unavailable.

At block B1420, the processor 1140 may receive the public key from the applied key management system 1010. The public key may be authorized by the applied key management system 1010 according to the policies 115. At block B1430, the processor 1140 may use the received public key to encrypt an application message (e.g., an email) to the recipient.

FIG. 15 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key request method 1500 according to various embodiments. Referring to FIGS. 1-15, the encryption key request method 1500 may be performed by the processor 1270 of the applied key management system 1010 according to some embodiments. At block B1510, the processor 1270 (e.g., the applied key management server interface 1210) may receive the request to obtain a public key from the communication device 1000 (e.g., from the applied key management client interface 1120) in some embodiments. The request may include the email address or account identifier identifying the recipient whose public key may be unavailable.

At block B1520, the processor 1270 may determine whether the request is authorized by the policies 115. For instance, the request agent 1220 may receive the request from the applied key management server interface 1210 and generate an action request based on the request. The action request may include one or more of an email address or account identifier identifying the recipient whose public key may be unavailable at the communication device 100, identifier representing the communication device 1000, or the like. The action module 1230 may present the action request to the policy engine 1240 for inspection by the policies 115.

In some embodiments, the policy engine 1240 may determine whether the communication device 1000 may be authorized to request a public key based on the policies 115. For instance, the communication device 1000 may be associated with a particular node within a hierarchical structure or a particular group/classification. Based on the identifier of the communication device 1000, the policy engine 1240 may determine the associated node and/or group of the communication device 1000. The policy engine 1240 may then determine whether the node (or parent node(s)) and/or group associated with the communication device 1000 may be associated with authorization to request a public key. Illustrating with a non-limiting example, at least one of the policies 115 may indicate that if the communication device 1000 is associated with node B or Group 2, then the action request corresponding to the communication device 1000 may be denied. Illustrating with another non-limiting example, at least one of the policies 115 may indicate that if the node (e.g., node B) associated with the communication device 1000 has a particular parent node (e.g., node A), then the action request corresponding to the communication device 1000 may be denied.

Illustrating with another non-limiting example, the policy engine 1240 may determine whether an action request for the particular recipient (identified by the email address or account identifier) may be authorized. At least one of the policies 115 may indicate that an action request for an email address or account identifier may not be authorized in some embodiments. For instance, one of the policies 115 may indicate that if the email address associated with an action request is “RecipientA@koclient.com,” then the action request corresponding to the email address may be denied.

Illustrating with yet another non-limiting example, the policy engine 1240 may determine whether an action request may be authorized based on one or more other suitable key attributes 160 such as, but not limited to, key size of the public key, classification of the public key, time at which the public key has been requested, preferred PKI, role associated with the communication device 1000, name of the public key, or the like.

In some embodiments, the key attributes 160 including, but not limited to, the key size of the public key, classification of the public key, time at which the public key has been requested, preferred PKI, role associated with the communication device 1000, name of the public key, and/or the like may be included as a part of the request received by the applied key management system 1010 (e.g., a block B1510). In some embodiments, such key attributes 160 may be determined by the processor 1270 (e.g., the request agent, the action module 1230, agent 1250, or policy engine 1240) based on the email address or account identifier identifying the recipient. For example, the processor 1270 (e.g., the request agent, the action module 1230, agent 1250, or policy engine 1240) may determine the key attributes 160 for the public key associated with the recipient by checking a look-up table stored in the memory 1280.

In response to determining that the action request may not be authorized by the policies 115 (B1520:NO), the processor 1270 may be configured to send a failure message to the communication device 1000, at block B1530. For example, the policy engine 1240 may send a failure message to the action module 1230 in response to determining failure based on the policies 115. The action module 1230 may forward the failure message to the request agent 1220. The request agent 1220 may forward the failure message to the applied key management server interface 1210. The applied key management server interface 1210 may send the failure message to the communication device 1000.

The communication device 1000, in response to receiving the failure message, may notify the email sender (e.g., the operator of the communication device 1000) of the failure. For instance, the processor 1140 (e.g., the email client plugin 1110) may configure the output device of the user interface 1160 to display a visual message, output an audio message, or otherwise generate any suitable audiovisual or tactile feedback to the operator notifying the operator of the failure.

On the other hand, in response to determining that the action request may be authorized by the policies 115 (B1520:YES), the processor 1270 may be configured to connect to the PKI 1020, at block B1540. For example, the processor 1270 (e.g., the PKI interface 1260) may interface with the PKI 1020 via suitable standards to initiate communication with the PKI 1020. At block B1550, the processor 1270 (e.g., the PKI interface 1260) may request the public key corresponding to the action request from the PKI 1020. The PKI interface 1260 may act on behalf of the communication device 1000 to request the public key from the PKI 1020.

At block B1560, the processor 1270 (e.g., the PKI interface 1260) may determine whether the public key has been received from the PKI 1020. The PKI interface 1260 may receive the public key if the PKI 1020 can provide the requested public key. The PKI interface 1260 may receive a failure message from the PKI 1020 if the PKI 1020 cannot provide the requested public key.

In response to determining that the public key has not been received (B1560:NO), the processor 1270 may send a failure message to the communication device 1000, at block B1530. For example, the PKI interface 1260 may send a failure message to the action module 1230 in response to receiving the failure message. The action module 1230 may forward the failure message to the request agent 1220. The request agent 1220 may forward the failure message to the applied key management server interface 1210. The applied key management server interface 1210 may send the failure message to the communication device 1000.

The communication device 1000, in response to receiving the failure message, may notify the email sender (e.g., the operator of the communication device 1000) of the failure. For instance, the processor 1140 (e.g., the email client plugin 1110) may configure the output device of the user interface 1160 to display a visual message, output an audio message, or otherwise generate any suitable audiovisual or tactile feedback to the operator notifying the operator of the failure to receive the key from the PKI 1020.

On the other hand, in response to determining that the public key has been received (B1560:YES), the processor 1270 may send the public key to the communication device 1000, at block B1570. For example, the PKI interface 1260 may send the public key to the action module 1230 in response to receiving the public key. The action module 1230 may forward the public key to the request agent 1220. The request agent 1220 may forward the public key to the applied key management server interface 1210. The applied key management server interface 1210 may send the public key to the communication device 1000.

In some embodiments, the key attributes 160 may be determined once the public key has been issued by the PKI 1020 (B1560:YES). For example, the PKI interface 1260 may receive the public key from the PKI 1020 and forward the public key to the action module 1230. The action module 1230 or the policy engine 1240 may determine the relevant key attributes 160 for the public key and forward the key attributes 160 to the policy engine 1240 for evaluation in the manner described.

At block B1580, the processor 1270 may log the request and store the action in the memory 1280. The action module 1230 may store information related to the action, including the requesting device (e.g., the communication device 1000), the recipient (e.g., the email address or account identifier identifying the recipient), action type (e.g., public key request for email application), result (whether a public key has been successfully received from the PKI 1020 and/or sent to the communication device 1000), and/or the like.

FIG. 16 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key request method 1600 according to various embodiments. Referring to FIGS. 1-16, each of blocks B1610-B1650 may correspond to one or more of blocks B1510-B1580. At block B1610, the processor 1270 may receive the request from the communication device 1000 to obtain a public key from the applied key management system 1010 for an application (e.g., the email application 1105). The public key may be associated with a recipient of the application. The public key for the recipient may be unavailable.

At block B1620, the processor 1270 may evaluate the request based on the at least one policy 115. For example, the processor 1270 may present one or more of the identifier for the communication device 1000, the email address or email address or account identifier identifying the recipient whose public key may be unavailable, or other suitable key attributes 160 to be inspected by the at least one policy 115.

At block B1630, the processor 1270 may request the public key from the PKI 1020 in response to determining that the request being authorized by the at least one policy 115. At block B1640, the processor 1270 may receive the public key from the PKI 1020. At block B1650, the processor 1270 may send the public key to the communication device 1000.

In some embodiments, the communication device 1000 and the recipient may be associated with a same enterprise. In other embodiments, the recipient may be associated with an enterprise separate from that of the communication device 1000, such as in the key federation system 300. Illustrating with a non-limiting example, in the key federation system 300, the communication device (e.g., device A 350 a) may be associated with a first enterprise (e.g., enterprise A 390 a), and the recipient (e.g., device B 350 b) may be associated with a second enterprise (e.g., enterprise B 390 b). In such a scenario, the encryption key request mechanism may be similarly applicable. For example, the communication device (such as, but not limited to, the communication device 1000) may request the public key from a first applied key management system that is associated with a same enterprise and receive the public key from the first applied key management system in a manner similar to described with respect to the methods 1300 and 1400. The first applied key management system may be in communication with a second applied key management system (e.g., applied key management device B 310 b). Each of the first applied key management system and second applied key management system may be a system or server such as, but not limited to, the applied key management system 1010.

FIG. 17 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key request method 1700 according to various embodiments. Referring to FIGS. 1-17, the encryption key request method 1700 may be performed by a processor (such as, but not limited to, the processor 1270) of the first applied key management system according to some embodiments. At block B1710, the processor of the first applied key management system may receive the request to obtain a public key from the communication device in the manner described with respect to block B1510. At block B1720, the processor of the first applied key management system may determine whether the request is authorized by the policies in the manner described with respect to block B1520. The policies may be associated with the first enterprise and the first applied key management system.

In response to determining that the action request may not be authorized by the policies (B1720:NO), the processor of the first applied key management system may be configured to send a failure message to the communication device, at block B1730, in the manner described with respect to block B1530. On the other hand, in response to determining that obtaining the public key may be authorized (B1720:YES), the processor of the first applied key management system may send an inter-enterprise request to the second applied key management system at block B1740. The inter-enterprise request may include one or more of the email address or account identifier identifying the recipient whose public key may be unavailable, identifier representing the communication device, identifier representing the first enterprise, or the like.

At block B1750, the processor of the first applied key management system may determine whether the public key has been received from the second applied key management system. In response to determining that the public key has not been received from the second applied key management system, the processor of the first applied key management system may be configured to send a failure message to the communication device, at block B1730. On the other hand, in response to determining that the public key has been received from the second applied key management system, the processor of the first applied key management system may send the public key to the communication device.

FIG. 18 is a process flow diagram illustrating an example of an encryption key request method 1800 according to various embodiments. Referring to FIGS. 1-18, the encryption key request method 1800 may be performed by a processor (such as, but not limited to, the processor 1270 of the applied key management system 1010) of the second applied key management system according to some embodiments. The method 1800 may be similar to the method 1500, except that the second applied key management system may be in communication with the first applied key management system instead of being in communication with the communication device directly.

At block B1810, the processor of the second applied key management system may receive the inter-enterprise request to obtain a public key from the first applied key management system in some embodiments.

At block B1820, the processor of the second applied key management system may determine whether the inter-enterprise request is authorized by the policies associated with the second enterprise in a manner such as, but not limited to, described with respect to block B1520.

In response to determining that the public key may not be authorized by the policies (B1820:NO), the processor of the second applied key management system may be configured to send a failure message to the first applied key management system, at block B1830. The first applied key management system may then notify the communication device in the manner described.

On the other hand, in response to determining that the public key may be authorized by the policies (B1820:YES), the processor of the second applied key management system may be configured to connect to a PKI (such as, but not limited to, the PKI 1020) at block B1840 in a manner similar to described with respect to block B1540. At block B1850, the processor of the second applied key management system may request the public key from the PKI in a manner similar to described with respect to block B1550.

At block B1860, the processor of the second applied key management system may determine whether the public key has been received from the PKI in a manner similar to described with respect to block B1560. In response to determining that the public key has not been received (B1860:NO), the processor of the second applied key management system may send a failure message to the first applied key management system, at block B1830. On the other hand, in response to determining that the public key has been received (B1860:YES), the processor of the second applied key management system may send the public key to the first applied key management system, at block B1870.

In some embodiments, each of the first applied key management system and second applied key management system may maintain a mapping of resources foreign to its own enterprise. Incoming inter-enterprise requests may be associated with the foreign resources.

The various embodiments illustrated and described are provided merely as examples to illustrate various features of the claims. However, features shown and described with respect to any given embodiment are not necessarily limited to the associated embodiment and may be used or combined with other embodiments that are shown and described. Further, the claims are not intended to be limited by any one example embodiment.

The foregoing method descriptions and the process flow diagrams are provided merely as illustrative examples and are not intended to require or imply that the steps of various embodiments must be performed in the order presented. As will be appreciated by one of skill in the art the order of steps in the foregoing embodiments may be performed in any order. Words such as “thereafter,” “then,” “next,” etc. are not intended to limit the order of the steps; these words are simply used to guide the reader through the description of the methods. Further, any reference to claim elements in the singular, for example, using the articles “a,” “an” or “the” is not to be construed as limiting the element to the singular.

The various illustrative logical blocks, modules, circuits, and algorithm steps described in connection with the embodiments disclosed herein may be implemented as electronic hardware, computer software, or combinations of both. To clearly illustrate this interchangeability of hardware and software, various illustrative components, blocks, modules, circuits, and steps have been described above generally in terms of their functionality. Whether such functionality is implemented as hardware or software depends upon the particular application and design constraints imposed on the overall system. Skilled artisans may implement the described functionality in varying ways for each particular application, but such implementation decisions should not be interpreted as causing a departure from the scope of the present invention.

The hardware used to implement the various illustrative logics, logical blocks, modules, and circuits described in connection with the embodiments disclosed herein may be implemented or performed with a general purpose processor, a DSP, an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) or other programmable logic device, discrete gate or transistor logic, discrete hardware components, or any combination thereof designed to perform the functions described herein. A general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor, but, in the alternative, the processor may be any conventional processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine. A processor may also be implemented as a combination of computing devices, e.g., a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, one or more microprocessors in conjunction with a DSP core, or any other such configuration. Alternatively, some steps or methods may be performed by circuitry that is specific to a given function.

In some exemplary embodiments, the functions described may be implemented in hardware, software, firmware, or any combination thereof. If implemented in software, the functions may be stored as one or more instructions or code on a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium or non-transitory processor-readable storage medium. The steps of a method or algorithm disclosed herein may be embodied in a processor-executable software module which may reside on a non-transitory computer-readable or processor-readable storage medium. Non-transitory computer-readable or processor-readable storage media may be any storage media that may be accessed by a computer or a processor. By way of example but not limitation, such non-transitory computer-readable or processor-readable storage media may include RAM, ROM, EEPROM, FLASH memory, CD-ROM or other optical disk storage, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other medium that may be used to store desired program code in the form of instructions or data structures and that may be accessed by a computer. Disk and disc, as used herein, includes Compact Disc (CD), laser disc, optical disc, Digital Versatile Disc (DVD), floppy disk, and blu-ray disc where disks usually reproduce data magnetically, while discs reproduce data optically with lasers. Combinations of the above are also included within the scope of non-transitory computer-readable and processor-readable media. Additionally, the operations of a method or algorithm may reside as one or any combination or set of codes and/or instructions on a non-transitory processor-readable storage medium and/or computer-readable storage medium, which may be incorporated into a computer program product.

The preceding description of the disclosed embodiments is provided to enable any person skilled in the art to make or use the present invention. Various modifications to these embodiments will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, and the generic principles defined herein may be applied to some embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of the invention. Thus, the present invention is not intended to be limited to the embodiments shown herein but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the following claims and the principles and novel features disclosed herein. 

What is claimed is:
 1. A method for obtaining a public key for an application of a communication device, the method comprising: receiving a request from the communication device to obtain the public key; evaluating the request based on at least one policy; requesting the public key from a public key infrastructure (PKI) in response to determining that the request is authorized; receiving the public key from the PKI; identifying one or more key attributes associated with the public key; evaluating the one or more key attributes based on at least one second policy; determining acceptability of the public key based on the one or more key attributes indicating that cryptographic considerations of the public key conforms to the at least one second policy; and sending the public key to the communication device; wherein the sending of the public key to the communication device is in response to determining that the public key is acceptable based on the at least one second policy.
 2. The method of claim 1, wherein: the application is an email application; the request corresponds to a recipient of an email; the request comprises an email address corresponding to the recipient; and the public key is associated with the recipient.
 3. The method of claim 1, wherein: the request from the communication device is received via a first network link; and the public key is request from the PKI via a second network link.
 4. The method of claim 3, wherein evaluating the request based on the at least one policy comprises determining whether requesting the public key for the email address corresponding to the recipient is authorized.
 5. The method of claim 1, wherein evaluating the request based on the at least one policy comprises determining whether the communication device is authorized to request the public key based on the at least one policy.
 6. The method of claim 1, further comprising connecting to the PKI.
 7. The method of claim 1, further comprising sending a failure message to the communication device in response to determining that the request is unauthorized.
 8. The method of claim 1, further comprising: determining whether the public key is received; and sending the public key in response to determining that the public key has been received.
 9. The method of claim 8, further comprising sending a failure message to the communication device in response to determining that the public key has not been received.
 10. An applied key management system for providing a public key to an application of a communication device, the system comprising: a memory; and a processor, the processor is configured to: receive a request from the communication device to obtain the public key; evaluate the request based on at least one policy; request the public key from a public key infrastructure (PKI) in response to determine that the request is authorized; receive the public key from the PKI; identify one or more key attributes associated with the public key; evaluate the one or more key attributes based on at least one second policy; determine acceptability of the public key based on the one or more key attributes indicating that cryptographic considerations of the public key conforms to the at least one second policy; and send the public key to the communication device in response to determining that the public key is acceptable based on the at least one second policy.
 11. The system of claim 10, wherein: the application is an email application; the request corresponds to a recipient of an email; the request comprises an email address corresponding to the recipient; and the public key is associated with the recipient.
 12. The system of claim 10, wherein: the request from the communication device is received via a first network link; and the public key is requested from the PKI via a second network link.
 13. The system of claim 12, wherein to evaluate the request based on the at least one policy, the processor is further configured to determine whether requesting the public key for the email address corresponding to the recipient is authorized.
 14. The system of claim 10, wherein to evaluate the request based on the at least one policy, the processor is further configured to determine whether the communication device is authorized to request the public key based on the at least one policy.
 15. The system of claim 10, wherein the processor is further configured to connect to the PKI.
 16. The system of claim 10, wherein the processor is further configured to send a failure message to the communication device in response to determining that the request is unauthorized.
 17. The system of claim 10, wherein the processor is further configured to: determine whether the public key is received; and send the public key in response to determining that the public key has been received.
 18. The system of claim 17, wherein the processor is further configured to send a failure message to the communication device in response to determining that the public key has not been received.
 19. A non-transitory processor-readable medium having processor-readable instructions, such that, when executed, causes a processor to: receive a request from the communication device to obtain the public key for an application of the communication device; evaluate the request based on at least one policy; request the public key from a public key infrastructure (PKI) in response to determine that the request is authorized; receive the public key from the PKI; identify one or more key attributes associated with the public key; evaluate the one or more key attributes based on at least one second policy; determine acceptability of the public key based on the one or more key attributes indicating that cryptographic considerations of the public key conforms to the at least one second policy; and send the public key to the communication device in response to determining that the public key is acceptable based on the at least one second policy.
 20. The non-transitory processor-readable medium of claim 19, wherein: the application is an email application; the request corresponds to a recipient of an email; the request comprises an email address corresponding to the recipient; and the public key is associated with the recipient.
 21. The method of claim 1, wherein: the public key is for a recipient of a communication from the communication device; the request includes at least a unique identifier of the recipient; and wherein evaluating the request comprises determining whether the communication device is authorized to receive the public key for the recipient based on the unique identifier of the recipient being acceptable based on the at least one policy. 